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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

ILLINOIS BIOMETRIC INFORMATION PRIVACY ACT
LITIGATION IN FEDERAL COURTS: EVALUATING THE
STANDING DOCTRINE IN PRIVACY CONTEXTS
ABSTRACT
Biometric technology, used to identify individuals based on their
unchangeable and unique attributes such as fingerprints or facial geometry, has
become commonplace in modern life. In Illinois, the use of biometric
information by private organizations is regulated by the Illinois Biometric
Privacy Act (“BIPA”), which came into effect in 2008 as the nation’s first state
biometric information privacy statute. BIPA is unique in that it includes a
private right of action and provides for recovery of liquidated damages where
the statute is violated, which has resulted in plaintiffs bringing steadily
increasing numbers of class-action suits under the law. This note examines, in
three parts, the current circuit split regarding Article III standing in federal
courts that has arisen from BIPA litigation where only procedural BIPA
violations are alleged (i.e., where there was a technical violation of the law
which purportedly caused no direct harm to the plaintiff). It first explores the
history and provisions of BIPA and federal litigation brought under the statute.
The note next examines federal jurisdiction over BIPA suits, current Article III
jurisprudence, and the history of the circuit split, including how standing has
been determined in BIPA suits in the Second, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits.
Finally, the note hypothesizes how the Supreme Court might resolve this split in
a future ruling, analyzes the impact such a resolution could have, and provides
an opinion on the correct resolution.
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INTRODUCTION
Biometric technology, used to identify individuals based on their
unchangeable and unique attributes (such as fingerprints, facial scans, retinas,
etc.), has quickly become commonplace over the last several years as biometrics
are incorporated into many popular devices across different areas of our lives.
Fingerprint scanners are used for everything from checking in guests at tanning
salons and theme parks to timekeeping at many workplaces. Iris recognition—
the scanning of an individual’s unique iris in their eye for identification—is used
by governments in border security and military applications. 1 Most people do
not think twice about unlocking their iPhone by quickly glancing their face
towards the phone (thus allowing the device to capture a facial scan). Once this
biometric information has been collected, analyzed, and identified as belonging
to the same person to whom the phone belongs, the phone is unlocked and ready
for use—all in the span of a second and without lifting a finger.
Each of these scenarios represent a use of biometric data—the physical and
personal characteristics that make each human being unique. Biometric data has
been defined as “a digital or analog representation of physical attributes that can
be used to uniquely identify us.” 2 Biometrics enable digital technologies to
recognize and notify us when we appear in photos on social media that we
weren’t tagged in and are quickly replacing the scanning of a badge as an
efficient, foolproof means of clocking in at work. However, what makes
biometrics so ideal for identification purposes is the fact that biometric
technology analyzes users’ unchangeable physical characteristics to determine
their identity—meaning that when there is a data breach containing biometric
information, the data that has leaked is users’ unique physical characteristics;
they cannot simply change their password to protect their information.
The Illinois Biometric Privacy Act (“BIPA” or the “Act”) has been in effect
since 2008 and was the nation’s first state statute protecting biometric
information. 3 Biometric data is protected, to varying degrees, in state statutes
elsewhere: both Texas and Washington also have statutes covering biometric

1. See, e.g., Spencer Ackerman, U.S. Scans Afghan Inmates for Biometric Database, WIRED
(Aug. 25, 2010, 12:37 PM), https://www.wired.com/2010/08/military-prison-builds-big-afghanbiometric-database/ [https://perma.cc/28S4-ZNAZ]; Ahmad N. Al-Raisi & Ali M. Al-Khouri, Iris
Recognition and the Challenge of Homeland and Border Control Security in UAE, 25 TELEMATICS
& INFORMATICS 117, 124 (2008).
2. New NIST Biometric Data Standard Adds DNA, Footmarks and Enhanced Fingerprint
Descriptions, NAT’L INST. OF STANDARDS & TECH. (Dec. 6, 2011), https://www.nist.gov/newsevents/news/2011/12/new-nist-biometric-data-standard-adds-dna-footmarks-and-enhanced
[https://perma.cc/9ME2-R9GF].
3. Rosa M. Tumialàn, et. al., BIPA Class Actions: The Next Generation of Data Privacy
Liability Coverage, DRI FOR THE DEFENSE 50, 50 (May 2019).
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information privacy specifically, 4 while in California, the California Consumer
Privacy Act (“CCPA”) includes biometric information as a type of personal
information subject to the law’s protections, 5 and California voters additionally
passed Proposition 24, known as the California Privacy Rights Act of 2020
(“CPRA”), in November 2020. 6 The CPRA will, among other changes,
designate biometric information processed “for the purpose of uniquely
identifying a consumer” as “sensitive personal information”, 7 a new category of
personal information that provides consumers with additional safeguards. 8
Finally, other states include biometric information protections in their general
data security breach notification statutes, 9 and some states have statutes specific
to the use of genetic information as well. 10
Under BIPA, private entities can be liable for significant damage awards for
their routine handling of biometric data. The Act’s specific provisions are
discussed in more detail in Section I.A of this note. BIPA is unique among
biometric laws in that it affords a private right of action to individuals, providing
that “[a]ny person aggrieved” by a violation of its provisions “shall have a right
of action” against an “offending party.” 11 Further, the Act provides for recovery
4. Michelle J. Anderson & Jim Halpert, Washington Becomes the Third State with a
Biometric Privacy Law: Five Key Differences, 1 J. ROBOTICS, A.I. & L. 41, 41 (Jan.–Feb. 2018).
5. Charles N. Insler, How to Ride the Litigation Rollercoaster Driven by the Biometric
Information Privacy Act, 43 S. ILL. U. L. J. 819, 821 (Summer 2019).
6. Matthew A. Diaz & Kurt R. Hunt, California Approves the CPRA, a Major Shift in U.S.
Privacy Regulation, NAT’L L. REV. (Nov. 17, 2020), https://www.natlawreview.com/article/califor
nia-approves-cpra-major-shift-us-privacy-regulation [https://perma.cc/XY8Q-P49U].
7. Text of Proposed Laws: California General Election, Tuesday, November 3, 2020,
CALIFORNIA SECRETARY OF STATE 1, 58 (Aug. 10, 2020), https://vig.cdn.sos.ca.gov/2020/general
/pdf/topl.pdf [https://perma.cc/W9JG-XMBA].
8. See Cynthia Cole et al., Move Over, CCPA: The California Privacy Rights Act Gets the
Spotlight Now, BLOOMBERG LAW (Nov. 16, 2020, 3:00 AM), https://news.bloomberglaw.com
/daily-labor-report/move-over-ccpa-the-california-privacy-rights-act-gets-the-spotlight-now
[https://perma.cc/2YB9-LLWT].
9. Connecticut, Iowa, Nebraska, North Carolina, Oregon, Wisconsin, and Wyoming include
biometric information in their general data breach statutes. See Jason B. Binimow, Annotation,
State Statutes Regulating Collection or Disclosure of Consumer Biometric or Genetic Information,
41 A.L.R. Fed. 7th Art. 4 (2019). Arkansas and New York have recently added biometric
information as well. Natalie Prescott, The Anatomy of Biometric Laws: What U.S. Companies Need
to Know in 2020, LAW.COM (Nov. 15, 2019), https://www.law.com/therecorder/2019/11/15/theanatomy-of-biometric-laws-what-u-s-companies-need-to-know-in-2020/ [https://perma.cc/8MGY
-MZSH].
10. See, e.g., Alaska Genetic Privacy Act, ALASKA STAT. § 18.13.010 (2019) (strictly limiting
genetic testing and access to, retention, and disclosure of genetic data without the “informed and
written consent” of the individual); NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 629.101–201 (2019) (prohibiting the
collection, retention, or disclosure of genetic information without obtaining consent from the
individual).
11. 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 14/20 (2019). This can be compared with other state biometric
privacy laws that reserve enforcement to attorneys general: for example, Washington State’s
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of liquidated damages in the event an entity violates the Act, 12 meaning the issue
of who is considered a “person aggrieved” by BIPA violations can have
significant financial and remedial consequences for defendants.
This note will discuss the current circuit split regarding Article III standing
in federal courts that has arisen from litigation concerning procedural BIPA
violations (i.e., where there was a technical violation of the law, which
purportedly caused no direct harm) alleged against corporate users of biometrics,
including technology services such as photo-sharing websites, social media
platforms, video games, and employers. In 2017, the Second Circuit, in an
unpublished opinion, dismissed a BIPA claim for lack of standing in Santana v.
Take-Two Interactive Software. 13 In August 2019, the Ninth Circuit reached the
opposite conclusion in Patel v. Facebook, Inc., holding that the procedural
violations at issue harmed a concrete interest, giving the plaintiffs standing to
sue. 14 By that time, the Seventh Circuit, which covers Illinois, had not ruled on
BIPA standing (except in one case applicable only to a narrow subset of
transportation-industry employees), though the district courts beneath it had
issued conflicting opinions on the matter. 15 This changed in May 2020, when
the Seventh Circuit in Bryant v. Compass Group USA, Inc. held that certain
procedural violations of BIPA constituted a concrete injury sufficient to give
standing, while also holding that other procedural violations were not concrete
injuries and thus were insufficient to confer standing. 16 The Seventh Circuit
further expanded its BIPA jurisprudence in Fox v. Dakkota Integrated Systems, 17
where it found Article III standing, and Thornley v. Clearview AI, where it did
not. 18 The issue of federal standing in BIPA litigation remains unresolved after
biometric privacy statute states that its provisions “may be enforced solely by the attorney general
. . . “ WASH. REV. CODE § 19.375.030(2) (2019). Similarly, the biometric privacy statute in Texas
provides for violators to be subject to a maximum per-violation penalty, stating that “[t]he attorney
general may bring an action to recover the civil penalty.” TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. §
503.001(d) (West 2019).
12. 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 14/20(1)–(2) (2019).
13. 717 F. App’x. 12, 18 (Nov. 21, 2017). While Santana is a summary order, meaning it does
not have precedential effect in the Second Circuit, splits involving “unpublished order[s]” have
garnered attention of the Court before. See, e.g., Lynce v. Mathis, 519 U.S. 433, 436 (1997) (Court
granted certiorari “to resolve the conflict” where the Tenth Circuit reached a different conclusion
on similar facts than the Eleventh Circuit’s earlier unpublished order).
14. 932 F.3d 1264, 1267 (9th Cir. 2019).
15. See, e.g., Rivera v. Google, Inc., 366 F. Supp. 3d 998, 1014 (N.D. Ill. 2018) (dismissing
for lack of subject matter jurisdiction “because Plaintiffs have not suffered concrete injuries for
Article III purposes”); Monroy v. Shutterfly, Inc., No. 16 C 10984, 2017 WL 4099846, at *8 n.5
(N.D. Ill. Sept. 15, 2017) (concluding that “[Plaintiff] has alleged a sufficient injury-in-fact for
Article III purposes”).
16. Bryant v. Compass Group USA, Inc., 958 F.3d 617, 619, 626 (7th Cir. 2020) (concerning
consumer use of vending machines utilizing biometric technology).
17. 980 F.3d 1146, 1156 (7th Cir. 2020).
18. 984 F.3d 1241, 1249 (7th Cir. 2021).
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these opinions, and, in the wider context of data privacy litigation, Article III
standing to sue in federal court remains a critical issue for plaintiffs in most data
privacy causes of action, especially putative class actions. 19
Section I of this note discusses the history and provisions of the Act, BIPA’s
place within the wider privacy regulatory framework in the U.S., and federal
litigation arising under the statute. Section II examines federal jurisdiction in
BIPA suits, the determination of Article III standing in federal courts, the history
of the circuit split regarding federal BIPA standing, and how standing has been
determined in BIPA litigation in the Second, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits.
Section III applies the earlier discussions and analysis to hypothesize how the
Supreme Court might resolve this split in a potential future ruling, analyzes the
impact such a resolution could have, and provides an opinion on the correct
resolution.
I. BACKGROUND
A.

BIPA’s Applicability and Provisions

BIPA was introduced into the Illinois Senate in February 2008 and passed
into law later that year. 20 The Act was designed to address the growth in the use
of biometric information in the business and security sectors, the fact that the
members of the public were “weary” of such use, the inability of consumers to
change their own biometric identifiers, and because the “full ramifications of
biometric technology [were] not fully known.” 21
BIPA regulates the use of biometric data in all private businesses,
nonprofits, and other associations. 22 It exempts from its coverage public-sector
organizations, specifically any “[s]tate or local government agency” or “any
court of Illinois, a clerk of the court, or a judge or justice thereof.” 23
BIPA imposes five requirements upon private entities who handle biometric
data: notification, consent, ban on profit, ban on disclosure, and storage and
security requirements. The alleged violation of any or all of these provisions,

19. CLASS ACTION LITIGATION, 3 E-COMMERCE AND INTERNET LAW 26.15 (Apr. 2020),
Westlaw (database updated Apr. 2020).
20. Anna L. Metzger, Comment, The Litigation Rollercoaster of BIPA: A Comment on the
Protection of Individuals from Violations of Biometric Information Privacy, 50 LOY. U. CHI. L.J.
1051, 1062–63 (2019).
21. 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 14/5 (2018). It has been noted that “[f]ew outsiders paid attention
to negotiations over BIPA,” in contrast to attempts to pass data-privacy legislation in the current
environment, where “tech companies unleash armies to deflect or shape proposed regulations.”
Shira Ovide, The Best Law You’ve Never Heard Of, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 23, 2021), https://www.ny
times.com/2021/02/23/technology/the-best-law-youve-never-heard-of.html [https://perma.cc/TG
R6-KRRA].
22. 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 14/10 (2018).
23. Id.
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particularly the notification, consent, and disclosure requirements, serves as the
harm for which the plaintiff is seeking a remedy in suits brought under BIPA.
The notification provision requires that private entities who possess
biometric data must develop and make publicly available a written policy that
details how long the entity will retain the biometric data and a schedule for the
permanent destruction of biometric data. BIPA requires destruction of biometric
data once the initial purpose for collecting the data has been fulfilled or within
three years of the individual’s last interaction with the private entity, whichever
occurs first. 24
The consent provision consists of three requirements that must be fulfilled
for a private entity to be allowed to handle biometric data. First, it must inform
the individual in writing that their biometric data is being collected. 25 Second, it
must inform the individual in writing of the purpose of the biometric collection
and the length for which the biometric data will be collected, stored, and used. 26
Third and finally, it must receive a written release for the biometric collection
that is executed by the individual whose biometric data is being collected. 27
The ban on profit provision prohibits any private entity from selling, leasing,
trading, or “otherwise [profiting] from a person’s or a customer’s biometric
[data].” 28 The disclosure ban provision forbids a private entity from the
disclosure, redisclosure, or other dissemination of an individual’s biometric data
except where the data subject has consented to the disclosure or redisclosure, or
where the disclosure or redisclosure completes a financial transaction that the
data subject has requested or authorized. 29 The Act also allows for disclosure or
redisclosure where required by federal, state, or local law or by valid warrant or
subpoena. 30
The storage and security requirements provision requires, first, that private
entities use “the reasonable standard of care within the private entity’s industry”
when storing, transmitting, and protecting from disclosure of biometric data in
their possession. 31 Second, it requires private entities—when storing,
transmitting, and protecting from disclosure of the biometric data they possess—
to use “a manner that is the same as or more protective than the manner in which
the private entity stores, transmits, and protects other confidential and sensitive
information.” 32

24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.

740 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 14/15(a) (2019).
Id. § 14/15(b)(1).
Id. § 14/15(b)(2).
Id. § 14/15(b)(3).
Id. § 14/15(c).
740 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 14/15(d)(1)–(2) (2019).
Id. § 14/15(d)(3)–(4).
Id. § 14/15(e)(1).
Id. § 14/15(e)(2).
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Though BIPA is an Illinois statute, its reach can extend far beyond Illinois,
implicating defendants with no Illinois operations, who may be surprised to find
out they are subject to the Act’s requirements. 33 While courts have stated that
the Act does not apply extraterritorially, 34 to determine whether BIPA litigation
can proceed, courts perform a fact-intensive personal jurisdiction analysis to
determine whether Illinois courts have jurisdiction over a defendant. Courts have
general jurisdiction if the corporate defendant has continuous and systematic
affiliations with Illinois to render them essentially at home in the state and
specific jurisdiction if there is sufficient affiliation between Illinois and the
underlying controversy. 35 Though courts have dismissed BIPA suits for lack of
personal jurisdiction due to a defendant’s lack of contacts with Illinois, 36
dismissal for lack of personal jurisdiction is a relatively rare occurrence. Most
BIPA suits are brought against either an employer with Illinois facilities and/or
employees or a consumer-facing company who uses biometrics and sufficiently
targets Illinois consumers, both of which are sufficient to establish a court’s
personal jurisdiction over a defendant.
Recent BIPA jurisprudence on the subject of BIPA’s geographic reach
serves mostly as a reminder that even entities far away from Illinois should be
aware of the law. In Bray v. Lathem Time Co., the court contemplated a suit
against a company that made workplace timekeeping systems which utilized
biometrics. 37 It dismissed the case because it lacked personal jurisdiction over
the defendant, a company based in Georgia with no Illinois operations who only
advertised its timekeeping systems to third-party employers, not the plaintiffs. 38
However, in a similar case, Figueroa v. Kronos Inc., the Northern District of
Illinois refused to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction a case brought against
the maker of a different biometric-based timekeeping system, which was utilized
by the plaintiffs’ employers. 39 The court did not discuss personal jurisdiction,
but noted that the defendant sold its systems to “thousands of employers in
Illinois” and found that BIPA requires all entities handling biometrics to comply,
including both an employer who uses biometric-based timekeeping systems and

33. In fact, commentators have noted that “[t]he extent of BIPA’s geographical reach is not
yet fully known.” Taylor Levesque, et al., Beyond Borders: COVID-19 Highlights the Potential
Widespread Impact of the Illinois Biometric Information Privacy Act (“BIPA”), LOCKE LORD
QUICKSTUDY (May 21, 2020), https://www.lockelord.com/newsandevents/publications/2020/09
/beyond-borders-covid19-highlights [https://perma.cc/3UJQ-XQ3R].
34. Rivera v. Google Inc., 238 F. Supp. 3d 1088, 1100 (N.D. Ill. 2017).
35. See McGoveran v. Amazon Web Servs., Inc., No. 3:20-CV-31-NJR, 2020 WL 5602819,
at *10–11 (S.D. Ill. Sept. 18, 2020).
36. See Bray v. Lathem Time Co., No. 19-3157, 2020 WL 1492742, at *11 (C.D. Ill. Mar. 27,
2020).
37. Id. at *1.
38. Id. at *12–13.
39. Figueroa v. Kronos Inc., 454 F. Supp. 3d 772, 779, 792 (N.D. Ill. 2020).
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the companies who supply those systems. 40 Thus, it would behoove all
companies with customers in Illinois to note the potential for liability under
BIPA.
BIPA’s private right of action, afforded to any individual “aggrieved” under
the statute, provides for either liquidated damages of $1,000 or actual damages,
whichever is greater, per negligent violation, and for liquidated damages of
$5,000 or actual damages, whichever is greater, per intentional or reckless
violation. 41 However, “BIPA does not define ‘intentionally’ or ‘recklessly.’” 42
Courts use the Illinois common law definitions of these terms. 43 While many
suits claim reckless or intentional violations, not a single BIPA case has made it
to trial, 44 so there is limited jurisprudence to illustrate the difference between
negligent and intentional or reckless BIPA violations. 45 Recent BIPA decisions
clarify that mere conclusory statements, where plaintiffs allege intentional and
reckless BIPA violations, are insufficient to overcome a motion to dismiss, 46
while on the other hand, defendants who have “made no effort to comply with
BIPA” may be committing reckless or intentional violations of the Act if they
have not made an attempt to comply. 47
The stakes for companies who use biometrics in their products and services
are quite high. Not only can there be penalties for each user for the improper
collection of their biometric information, but courts have interpreted BIPA to
allow for penalties for each specific instance of improper biometric collection. 48
40. Id. at 779, 783.
41. 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 14/20 (2019).
42. Rogers v. CSX Intermodal Terminals, Inc., 409 F. Supp. 3d 612, 618 (N.D. Ill. 2019).
43. See id. Intentional conduct is conduct performed with a “desire to cause consequences or
at least a substantially certain belief that the consequences will result.” Id. (citing Ziarko v. Soo
Line R. Co., 641 N.E. 2d 402, 405 (Ill. 1994)). Recklessness “denotes ‘a course of action which
shows an utter indifference to or a conscious disregard.’” Id. (citing Resolution Tr. Corp. v. Franz,
909 F. Supp. 1128, 1141 (N.D. Ill. 1995)).
44. As of January 2020. Allison Grande & Ben Kochman, BIPA Bares Its Teeth in Facebook
Biometric Privacy Deal, LAW360 (Jan. 30, 2020, 10:39 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/12
39383/ [https://perma.cc/75X4-SUBX].
45. See Celeste Bott, Breaking Down Illinois’ Biometric Privacy Litigation Boom, LAW360
(Apr. 27, 2020, 8:15 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/1252596/breaking-down-illinois-bio
metric-privacy-litigation-boom [https://perma.cc/8GHZ-AVHY]. (“[T]wo of the major [BIPA]
defenses have yet to be tested at all. One of those defenses is what it means under BIPA for a
defendant to be negligent or reckless for damages purposes.”).
46. Rogers, 409 F. Supp. 3d at 619.
47. Peatry v. Bimbo Bakeries USA, Inc., No. 19 C 2942, 2020 WL 919202, at *6 (N.D. Ill.
Feb. 26, 2020).
48. See Cothron v. White Castle System, Inc., 477 F. Supp. 3d 723, 732 (N.D. Ill. 2020).
Whether this interpretation will remain good law, though, remains in question—the defendant has
appealed to the Seventh Circuit. See Lauraann Wood, White Castle Urges 7th Cir. To Limit BIPA
Claim Accrual, LAW360 (Mar. 30, 2021, 5:05 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/1370291
[https://perma.cc/P8SK-AUT2].

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

2021]

ILLINOIS BIOMETRIC INFORMATION PRIVACY ACT LITIGATION

905

This can result in damages that can quickly become, in the words of one BIPA
defendant, “crippling.” 49
B.

BIPA’s Role in the U.S. Data Privacy Regulatory Scheme

BIPA occupies a unique place in the current data protections available to
American consumers in Illinois. Across the Atlantic, there is comprehensive
privacy regulation in Europe via the General Data Protection Regulation
(“GDPR”) which provides European Union citizens with, among other things,
the ability to monitor how companies use their data and the power to direct
companies in possession of their data to destroy it. 50 Biometric information is
included in the GDPR as “sensitive personal data” which provides additional
protections. 51 In the United States, there is little in the way of any substantive
data privacy controls outside of California. Washington and Texas also have
statutes concerning the privacy of biometric information, but individuals are not
able to enforce these statutes via private actions like they are with BIPA in
Illinois; only the states’ attorneys general may enforce these biometric privacy
laws. 52 While these laws are similar to BIPA, there are important differences.
Washington’s law, for example, does not apply to employers who use
employees’ biometrics in their timekeeping systems. 53 Despite the similarities,
the lack of private right of action has led commentators to state that “the
Washington and Texas laws ‘will likely be a footnote’” 54 and ultimately,

49. Cothron, 477 F. Supp. 3d at 733.
50. GDPR states that processing the data of natural persons is only lawful in a selected set of
circumstances, such as receiving consent of the data subject. Regulation 2016/679 of the European
Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 On the Protection of Natural Persons with Regard
to the Processing of Personal Data and On the Free Movement of Such Data, and Repealing
Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation), 2016 O.J. (L 119) 1 (EU) art. 6
[hereinafter GDPR]. Consumers may request a copy of their data and have the right to rectify
inaccuracies in their personal data held by third parties as well as to request the deletion of their
data. Id. at arts. 15–17.
51. The GDPR prohibits the processing of biometric information without the explicit consent
of the data subject or other limited exceptions. Id. at art. 9.
52. See TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. § 503.001(d) (2019); WASH. REV. CODE §
19.375.030(2) (2020).
53. Philip L. Gordon & Kwabena A. Appenteng, Dear Littler: What Does Our Company Need
To Do Before We Begin Using Biometric Timeclocks?, LITTLER (Dec. 6, 2017), https://www.littler
.com/publication-press/publication/dear-littler-what-does-our-company-need-do-we-begin-usingbiometric [https://perma.cc/ES3Z-KUBD].
54. Paul Shukovsky, Washington Biometric Privacy Law Lacks Teeth of Illinois Cousin,
Bloomberg Law (July 18, 2017, 7:26 AM), https://www.bloomberglaw.com/product/blaw/bloom
berglawnews/privacy-and-data-security/X8MBJH0C000000 [https://perma.cc/3ZPY-Y5UA].
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because of BIPA’s private right of action, it has been the focus of most biometric
privacy litigation. 55
Since January of 2020, California consumers have been given similar
powers to the GDPR under California’s CCPA. 56 The CCPA considers
biometric data as a category of personal data subject to the law’s protections, 57
and the recently-passed CPRA, which will take effect in 2023, will place
biometric data into a new “sensitive personal information” category with
additional safeguards. 58 While the CCPA grants California consumers many
new rights to control how private entities use their personal data, enforcement is
currently out of the consumer’s hands (for the most part). Consumers may only
sue when their nonencrypted and nonredacted personal information is accessed
by unauthorized third parties as a result of a business’s failure to implement and
maintain reasonable security. 59 Other than data breaches, enforcement is left to
the state attorney general. 60 The CPRA, however, creates additional enforcement
mechanisms in addition to those found in the CCPA. It establishes the California
Privacy Protection Agency, a state agency with the sole purpose of regulating
consumer data privacy that replaces the California attorney general as the chief
enforcer of the state’s privacy laws. 61 It also expands the private right of action
available to individuals. 62
Consumers in the rest of the country are left with few means to control the
use of their data. There are data breach regulations in most states, but these
statutes only come into play once data has been disclosed to unauthorized

55. Stephanie Sheridan & Meegan Brooks, Avoid Getting a Plaintiff’s Fingerprint Pointed at
You, LAW360 (Feb. 28, 2018, 1:27 PM), https://plus.lexis.com/api/permalink/490caa85-4d5c-40cc
-bc9e-e46e5d60ea3b/?context=1530671 [https://perma.cc/2KXV-FK8K].
56. The CCPA grants consumers the right to opt-out of the sale of their personal information
to third parties and requires businesses to notify consumers of the potential sale of their data and
their right to opt out. CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 1798.120(a)-(b) (2020); Consumers may request a copy
of their information that is held by businesses. Id. § 1798.110(a); Consumers also have the right to
request that businesses delete their personal information. Id. § 1798.105(a); CCPA applies to
companies with revenue greater than twenty-five million dollars and those that buy, sell, or share
the data of 50,000 or more consumers. Id. § 1798.140(c)(1). The International Association of
Privacy Professionals estimated that the law will apply to over 500,000 American businesses. Rita
Heimes & Sam Pfeifle, New California Privacy Law to Affect More Than Half a Million US
Companies, INT’L ASS’N OF PRIV. PROS. (July 2, 2018), https://iapp.org/news/a/new-california-pri
vacy-law-to-affect-more-than-half-a-million-us-companies/ [https://perma.cc/E3U7-VAPW].
57. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.140(o)(1)(E) (2020).
58. Diaz & Hunt, supra note 6.
59. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.150(a)(1) (2020).
60. Id. § 1798.155(b).
61. Diaz & Hunt, supra note 6.
62. Caitlin Fennessy, CPRA’s Top-10 Impactful Provisions, INT’L ASS’N OF PRIV. PROS.
(May 12, 2020), https://iapp.org/news/a/cpra-top-10-impactful-provisions/ [https://perma.cc/Q8K
R-NH33].
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parties. 63 Breach statutes do little to provide consumers any control over their
data—in fact, they may result in consumers only finding out that a company
possessed their data in the first place upon being notified of a data breach
affecting that company. 64 Federal legislation regarding data and information
privacy is relatively scant and most federal information statutes are concerned
with promoting the efficient flow of information and regulating specific types of
data or sectors of businesses such as healthcare information or financial
institutions. 65 Non-sector-specific privacy enforcement may be brought by the
Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) under Section 5 of the FTC Act, which bars
unfair and deceptive acts and practices in or effecting commerce. 66

63. See, e.g., MO. REV. STAT. § 407.1500 (2019) (requiring owners or licensors of personal
information to “provide notice to the affected consumer that there has been a breach of security,”
which is defined as “unauthorized access to and unauthorized acquisition of personal information”);
N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW § 899-aa (2019) (requiring personal data owners or licensors to “disclose any
breach . . . to any resident of New York state whose private information was, or is reasonably
believed to have been, accessed or acquired by a person without valid authorization”); TEX. BUS.
& COM. CODE ANN. § 521.053 (2019) (requiring data owners or licensors of personal data to
disclose breaches to “any individual whose sensitive personal information was, or is reasonably
believed to have been, acquired by an authorized person”).
64. For example, in 2017, a travel services company, Sabre Corporation, was subject to a data
breach, which included consumer payment information, in its SynXis reservation system, a
software product used to manage reservations at over 36,000 hotel properties. Jamie Biesiada,
Sabre Completes Investigation into Data Breach of Hotel Res System, TRAVEL WEEKLY (July 6,
2017), https://www.travelweekly.com/Travel-News/Travel-Technology/Sabre-completes-investi
gation-into-data-breach-of-hotel-res-system [https://perma.cc/C2LE-SHHG]. Consumers who had
made reservations at affected hotels likely would have no idea their data was held by Sabre.
65. See, e.g., Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, 42 U.S.C. §§
1320d-2–1320d-9 (2018) (regulating healthcare information); Gramm Leach Bliley Act, 15 U.S.C.
§ 6801 (2018) (regulating data held by financial institutions); Children’s Online Privacy Protection
Act, 15 U.S.C. § 6502 (2018) (regulating children’s information); Family Educational Rights and
Privacy Act, 20 U.S.C. § 1232g (2018) (regulating students’ information); Fair Credit Reporting
Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681–1681x (2018) (regulating information found in consumer and credit
reports); FCC Customer Proprietary Network Information Breach Rule, 47 C.F.R. § 64.2011 (2017)
(notification requirements applicable to telecommunications carriers when information about
consumer telephone calls are breached); Interagency Guidelines Establishing Information Security
Standards, 12 C.F.R. pt. 30, app. B (2014) (requiring notification of security breaches “when
warranted” to customers of financial). Many of these federal statutes were enacted before it was
common for consumers to use the Internet in a personal capacity. Kimberly A. Houser & W.
Gregory Voss, GDPR: The End of Google and Facebook or a New Paradigm in Data Privacy?, 25
RICH. J. L. & TECH. 1, 17 (2018).
66. 15 U.S.C. § 45. The FTC levied its first enforcement action based on the misuse of facial
recognition technology in 2021, when it reached a proposed settlement with photo app developer
Everalbum Inc. See Decision and Order, In re Everalbum, Inc., File No. 192-3172 (F.T.C. Jan. 11,
2021), 2021 WL 118895. This was seen as “an unequivocal warning that the FTC will make
policing facial recognition technology a priority for the foreseeable future.” David J. Oberly, FTC’s
First Settlement on Facial Recognition Technology Yields Lessons, BLOOMBERG LAW (Feb. 18,
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Given this state of data privacy regulation in the United States, BIPA is quite
unique, and while the history of litigation under the statute is quite brief, it
should be viewed as a tool that individuals—at least those who reside in and are
citizens of the state of Illinois—can use to protect their privacy and bring about
change in the use of biometric information by private companies. 67
C. BIPA Litigation
BIPA litigation began around 2015, 68 and since then, plaintiffs have brought
over 300 suits against companies in a variety of industries. 69 Much of the
litigation falls into two groups: employment cases and consumer-technology
cases. In employment cases, claims are based on violations of BIPA involving
employer use of employee’s biometric information and/or identifiers—usually
these cases involve time-keeping methods which require employee biometrics,
such as using fingerprints to clock in and out of shifts. 70 Consumer-technology
2021, 3:01 AM), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/business-and-practice/ftcs-first-settlement-onfacial-recognition-technology-yields-lessons [https://perma.cc/7ENG-MPTF].
67. Illinois lawyers have noted, in the wake of large settlements in class actions brought under
the Act, that “‘BIPA not only has teeth, but that those teeth are extremely sharp.’” Grande &
Kochman, supra note 44. Legal commentators state that “BIPA’s private cause of action has
meaningfully shaped the practices of companies who deploy biometrics.” Woodrow Hartzog,
BIPA: The Most Important Biometric Privacy Law in the US?, REGULATING BIOMETRICS: GLOBAL
APPROACHES AND URGENT QUESTIONS 96, 97 (Amba Kak ed., 2020), https://ainowinstitute.org
/regulatingbiometrics-hartzog.pdf [https://perma.cc/HH5V-YUD6]. One instance of the changes in
private companies’ behavior brought about by BIPA can be seen in the May 2020 decision by
Clearview AI, a facial recognition technology provider, to end all its service contracts with nonlaw enforcement entities in the hopes of avoiding BIPA damages. Id. at 96. Additionally, Clearview
stated that it was taking measures to prevent its technology from collecting data from Illinois
residents. Nick Statt, Clearview AI to Stop Selling Controversial Facial Recognition App to Private
Companies, THE VERGE (May 7, 2020, 8:29 PM), https://www.theverge.com/2020/5/7/21251387
/clearview-ai-law-enforcement-police-facial-recognition-illinois-privacy-law [https://perma.cc/8T
WZ-UVXD]. Despite these (seemingly belated) actions taken to avoid BIPA compliance,
Clearview found itself the defendant in several BIPA suits, one of which wound up before the
Seventh Circuit. See discussion infra Section II.D.6.
68. In 2015, the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois stated that it was
“unaware of any judicial interpretation of [BIPA].” Norberg v. Shutterfly, Inc., 152 F. Supp. 3d
1103, 1106 (N.D. Ill. 2015).
69. Gerald L. Maatman, Jr. et al., Biometric Privacy Class Actions by The Numbers: Analyzing
Illinois’ Hottest Class Action Trend, WORKPLACE CLASS ACTION BLOG (June 28, 2019),
https://www.workplaceclassaction.com/2019/06/biometric-privacy-class-actions-by-the-numbersanalyzing-illinois-hottest-class-action-trend/ [https://perma.cc/DZ5Z-YZVG].
70. See, e.g., Dixon v. Washington & Jane Smith Cmty–Beverly, No. 17 C 8033, 2018 WL
2445292, at *1 (N.D. Ill. May 31, 2018) (“[Plaintiff] asserts claims for . . . violation of Illinois’s
Biometric Information Privacy Act (BIPA) arising from [defendant’s] requirement that its
employees clock in and out of work by scanning their fingerprints onto a biometric timekeeping
device . . . “); Colon v. Dynacast, LLC, No. 19-cv-4561, 2019 WL 5536834, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Oct.
17, 2019) (“[The plaintiff] filed this putative class action complaint against her former employer
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cases involve providers of consumer services, often technology- or mediarelated services such as video games, social media platforms, and photo-sharing
services, but also a number of other services, such as vending machines and
tanning salons, who use the biometric information and/or identifiers of their
users. 71
Beyond standing, companies have taken a number of approaches to defend
against BIPA claims. In cases involving out-of-state defendants,
extraterritoriality defenses may be used. 72 In Illinois, state statutes do not apply
extraterritorially unless expressly intended to by the legislature—and there is no
sign that this is the case for the Act. 73 Thus, if the Act does not apply
extraterritorially, the asserted violations must have taken place in Illinois for
plaintiffs to be victorious and violations occurring to Illinois residents outside of
Illinois, therefore, would not constitute violations of the Act. 74 Under Illinois
law, “there is no single formula or bright-line test for determining whether a
transaction occurs within [the] state.” 75 Given the digital nature of many BIPA
claims, the fact that many defendants are not based in Illinois and the fact that
alleged violations may have occurred on remote servers or in the cloud may
present an issue for some BIPA actions. 76 However, this defense has not been
very successful in BIPA claims brought by consumers, because federal courts
have generally found sufficient connections to Illinois meaning BIPA is not
being applied extraterritorially. 77 Courts have also noted the lack of “nonresidents suing under Illinois law, which is the paradigmatic situation for the
presumption against the extraterritorial application of local law.” 78

. . . [who] used so-called biometric data to provide authentication for its time-card system.”);
Aguilar v. Rexnord LLC, No. 17 CV 9019, 2018 WL 3239715, at *1 (N.D. Ill. July 3, 2018) (“While
[the plaintiff] was an employee [of the defendant], [the defendant] implemented a time clock system
that used employees’ fingerprints to track when employees began and ended their workdays.”).
71. See, e.g., Norberg, 152 F. Supp. 3d at 1105 (“Defendants operate a number of websites
that provide digital photo storage, sharing, and photo prints and novelty gifts . . . “). This note
explores several of these types of cases in Section II.
72. See, e.g., Rivera v. Google Inc., 238 F. Supp. 3d 1088, 1100-01 (N.D. Ill. 2017).
73. Id. at 1100.
74. See id.
75. Id. at 1100–01 (quoting Avery v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 835 N.E.2d 801, 854
(Ill. 2005)).
76. See Insler, supra note 5, at 822.
77. See Rivera, 238 F. Supp. 3d at 1101–02 (noting that the fact that the plaintiffs were Illinois
residents, the photographs at issue were taken in Illinois, and were uploaded to the cloud from an
Illinois IP address, ultimately weighed in favor of a holding that the alleged violations primarily
occurred in Illinois); Monroy v. Shutterfly, Inc., No. 16 C 10984, 2017 WL 4099846, at *6 (N.D.
Ill. Sept. 15, 2017) (noting that the photo at issue was uploaded to the defendant’s website from a
device physically located in Illinois and via an Illinois IP address, and that “it [was] unclear” where
the actual scan of facial geometry took place and where that scan was stored).
78. In re Facebook Biometric Info. Priv. Litig., 326 F.R.D. 535, 547 (N.D. Cal. 2018).
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A related defense involves the dormant commerce clause of the U.S.
Constitution, which limits the ability of states to discriminate or burden interstate
commerce. 79 In Monroy v. Shutterfly, Inc., a case involving technical violations
of BIPA provisions in a social-media photo-tagging context, the defendant
argued that the application of BIPA would effectively regulate its conduct
outside of Illinois, ultimately “[projecting] . . . one state regulatory regime into
the jurisdiction of another State.” 80 The District Court for the Northern District
of Illinois rejected this argument, stating that “[a]pplying BIPA in this case
would not entail any regulation of [the defendant’s] gathering and storage of
biometric data obtained outside of Illinois” and noted that while the Act does
“[require the defendant] to comply with certain regulations if it wishes to operate
in Illinois,” it does not “[control the defendant’s] conduct in other states.” 81
Other courts adjudicating other BIPA claims have also rejected this defense. 82
Another interesting defense arises from the curious wording of the statute:
in the definition of “biometric identifier,” the Act states that “biometric
identifiers do not include . . . photographs.” 83 The Act then defines “[b]iometric
information” as “any information, regardless of how it is captured, converted,
stored, or shared, based on an individual’s biometric identifier used to identify
an individual.” 84 Thus, it would appear that faceprints derived from photos,
which are often the biometric information at issue in social-media BIPA claims,
are not considered biometric information under the law and thus not subject to
its protections. This has had varying levels of success in federal courts. The
District Court for the Northern District of California rejected this argument,
finding that the placement in the statute of the photograph exclusion as meaning
to only exclude paper—not digital—photographs. 85 The District Court for the
Northern District of Illinois held that the statute’s drafters did intend to exclude
all biometric data derived from any type of photograph, digital or paper. 86 It also

79. Monroy, 2017 WL 4099846, at *7.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Defendant Google raised this defense in Rivera, but the court held that it was unable to
determine whether BIPA was being used in the case to control commercial conduct wholly outside
Illinois because it needed “a better factual understanding of what is happening in the Google Photos
face-scan process.” Rivera v. Google Inc., 238 F. Supp. 3d 1088, 1103–04 (N.D. Ill. 2017).
Facebook raised this defense as well in an earlier stage of the Patel litigation, but the district court
flatly rejected this argument, noting that “[the] lawsuit is under an Illinois state statute on behalf of
Illinois residents who used Facebook in Illinois.” In re Facebook Biometric Info. Priv. Litig., No.
3:15-cv-03747-JD, 2018 WL 2197546, at *4 (N.D. Cal. May 14, 2018).
83. 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 14/10 (2018).
84. Id.
85. In re Facebook Biometric Info. Priv. Litig., 185 F. Supp. 3d 1155, 1171 (N.D. Cal. 2016).
86. Monroy v. Shutterfly, Inc., No. 16 C 10984, 2017 WL 4099846, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 15,
2017).
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found an open question of whether data obtained from a digital photograph may
constitute a “biometric identifier” under the Act. 87
The Article III standing issue, however, is the issue on which the Patel,
Santana, Bryant, Fox, and Thornley courts differ and which this note explores.
This topic is important in the context of data privacy, as the ability to
demonstrate sufficient harm to establish Article III standing has been a major
impediment to plaintiffs in data-privacy suits; scholars emphasize that most data
breach cases brought in federal courts “have not turned on whether the
defendants were at fault” but instead “have been bogged down with the issue of
harm.” 88
II. ARTICLE III STANDING & THE BIPA CIRCUIT SPLIT
A.

Standing

Questions of plaintiffs’ Article III standing are frequently raised by
defendants in BIPA claims in order to secure dismissal for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction. 89 To establish standing under Article III of the Constitution, “the
plaintiff must have suffered an ‘injury in fact’—an invasion of a legally
protected interest which is (a) concrete and particularized, and (b) ‘actual or
imminent, not “conjectural” or “hypothetical.”‘“ 90 The Supreme Court instructs
that a plaintiff does not “automatically [satisfy] the injury-in-fact requirement
whenever a statute grants a person a statutory right and purports to authorize that
person to sue to vindicate that right.” 91 As the Ninth Circuit explained, “it is not
enough for a plaintiff to allege that a defendant has violated a right created by a
statute; [courts] must still ascertain whether the plaintiff suffered a concrete
injury-in-fact due to the violation.” 92 Thus, for BIPA litigation, standing
defenses are most important in the cases in which the alleged violations are
purely technical or procedural violations of the statute—i.e., failures to follow
the exact instructions provided by the Act— because in these contexts, courts
must not only analyze the alleged statutory violation, but also determine whether
the plaintiff suffered a concrete injury sufficient to grant standing to sue.
In Illinois state courts, the issue of standing to sue for purely procedural
violations of BIPA was resolved by the Illinois Supreme Court’s 2019 decision
87. Id.
88. Daniel J. Solove & Danielle Keats Citron, Risk and Anxiety: A Theory of Data-Breach
Harms, 96 TEX. L. REV. 737, 739 (2018). See also E-COMMERCE AND INTERNET LAW, supra note
19 (“A number data of [sic] privacy putative class action suits and claims have been dismissed for
lack of standing . . . Even in security breach cases, standing may be an issue . . . “).
89. Insler, supra note 5, at 823.
90. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992) (citation omitted) (quoting
Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 155 (1990)).
91. Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1549 (2016).
92. Patel v. Facebook, Inc., 932 F.3d 1264, 1270 (9th Cir. 2019).
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in Rosenbach v. Six Flags Entertainment Corp. 93 The court stated that “when a
private entity fails to comply with one of [BIPA’s] requirements, that violation
constitutes an invasion, impairment, or denial of the statutory rights of any
person or customer whose biometric identifier or biometric information is
subject to the breach,” meaning that “such a person . . . would clearly be
‘aggrieved’ within the meaning of [BIPA].” 94 The court went on to clarify that
“[n]o additional consequences need be pleaded or proved” and that “[t]he
violation [of the provisions of BIPA], in itself, is sufficient to support the
individual’s or customer’s statutory cause of action.” 95 This ruling settled the
matter of whether purely procedural or technical violations of BIPA constitute
concrete injuries allowing suits to be brought under the Act in state courts.
However, this issue has yet to be resolved in federal courts, where much BIPA
litigation occurs; 96 oftentimes, plaintiffs will file suit in state court (where
standing is not an issue) only for the case to be removed to federal court by
defendants, who seem to have a clear preference for federal court. 97
Article III of the U.S. Constitution limits the jurisdiction of federal courts
by requiring them to hear only actual cases or controversies. 98 This jurisdictional
limitation creates the hurdle of Article III standing that suits must clear before
proceeding: standing “is the threshold question in every federal case,
determining the power of the court to entertain the suit.” 99 The Supreme Court’s
jurisprudence instructs that the constitutional requirement of standing consists
of three elements: (1) an actual injury in fact suffered by the plaintiff, “(2) that
is fairly traceable to the challenged conduct of the defendant, and (3) that is
likely to be redressed by a favorable judicial decision.” 100 To meet the “injuryin-fact” requirement, a plaintiff must suffer “an invasion of a legally protected
interest” which must be (a) “concrete and particularized” and (b) “actual or
93. 129 N.E.3d 1197 (Ill. 2019).
94. Id. at 1206.
95. Id.
96. In Bryant, the Seventh Circuit noted that “[h]elpful though Rosenbach may be, . . . we
cannot uncritically assume perfect overlap between the question before the state court and the one
before us” because “standing requirements in Illinois courts are more lenient than those imposed
by Article III.” Bryant v. Compass Grp. USA, Inc., 958 F.3d 617, 622 (7th Cir. 2020) (citing Greer
v. Illinois Hous. Dev. Auth., 524 N.E.2d 561, 574 (Ill. 1988)).
97. Jennifer Marsh, ANALYSIS: 7th Circuit’s BIPA Rulings Provide State Court Roadmap,
BLOOMBERG LAW (Feb. 18, 2021, 10:46 AM), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/bloomberg-lawanalysis/analysis-7th-circuits-bipa-rulings-provide-state-court-roadmap [https://perma.cc/TF6WHNKS] (finding, in a review of Illinois federal district court dockets from November 2020 through
January 2021, that only 12 BIPA complaints were originally filed in federal court, but at least 36
were removed to federal court from state courts).
98. U.S. CONST. art. 3, § 2, cl. 1.
99. Mahon v. Ticor Title Ins. Co., 683 F.3d 59, 62 (2d Cir. 2012) (quoting Warth v. Seldin,
422 U.S. 490, 498 (1975)).
100. Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1547 (2016).
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imminent, not ‘conjectural’ or ‘hypothetical.’” 101 If the alleged injury is
imminent, it must be “certainly impending to constitute injury in fact.” 102 The
alleged imminent injury cannot consist merely of “[a]llegations of possible
future injury.” 103 Finally, the Supreme Court has instructed that a plaintiff does
not necessarily meet the concrete injury requirement “whenever a statute grants
a person a statutory right and purports to authorize that person to sue to vindicate
that right.” 104
In Spokeo, the Court elaborated on the concreteness requirement that is
necessary to demonstrate injury-in-fact when bringing suit for statutory
violations. In that case, the Court reviewed the Ninth Circuit’s decision to
reverse the district court’s dismissal of the plaintiff’s action against defendant
Spokeo under the Fair Credit Reporting Act of 1970 (“FCRA”). 105 Spokeo
operated a website where users could search for other individuals by name, email, or phone number and gather information, including address, marital status,
approximate age, occupation, finances, hobbies, and other types of information
about that individual from a wide variety of databases that were indexed and
searched by Spokeo. 106 The plaintiff alleged that Spokeo qualified as a
“consumer reporting agency” as defined by the FCRA, and was thus required to
follow reasonable procedures to ensure the maximum accuracy of consumer
reports, notify providers and users of consumer information of their
responsibilities under the FCRA, limit the provision of consumer reports for
employment purposes, and post toll-free phone numbers where consumers can
request reports. 107 The FCRA further provides that agencies who fail to follow
its requirements are liable to individuals for actual damages or statutory
damages, ranging from $100 to $1,000 per violation, and attorney’s fees. 108 The
plaintiff brought suit under the FCRA, alleging that a search for him using
Spokeo’s website generated inaccurate information. 109
In its discussion of the concreteness requirement, the Court noted that
“concrete” harms are not always “tangible,” and affirmed the importance of the
legislature in identifying, via statute, intangible harms that meet Article III
requirements. 110 The Court reasoned that the FCRA protected against the
concrete harm of false information by attempting to “curb the dissemination of
101. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992) (quoting Whitmore v. Arkansas,
495 U.S. 149, 155 (1990)).
102. Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 568 U.S. 398, 409 (2013).
103. Id.
104. Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1549.
105. Id. at 1544.
106. Id. at 1546.
107. Id. at 1545–46.
108. Id. at 1545.
109. Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1546.
110. Id. at 1549.
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[false information] by adopting procedures designed to decrease that risk.” 111
However, the Court stated that “a plaintiff [does not] automatically satisf[y] the
injury-in-fact requirement whenever a statute grants a person a statutory right
and purports to authorize that person to sue to vindicate that right,” emphasizing
that “Article III standing requires a concrete injury even in the context of a
statutory violation.” 112 Thus, the statutory right to sue is not always enough
under the Constitution: even if a statute authorizes private lawsuits in the event
the statute is violated, and even if there has actually been a violation of the
statute, there must still be a concrete injury to have jurisdiction in federal court.
While the Court instructed that “the risk of real harm” can satisfy the
requirement of concreteness in the right instances, it concluded that there must
be some harm or material risk of harm beyond a “bare procedural violation” of
a statute to satisfy Article III’s requirements. 113 The case was remanded back to
the Ninth Circuit to perform a proper analysis of the concreteness of the injuries
alleged by the claim. 114
On remand, the Ninth Circuit undertook a concreteness analysis and
concluded that there were allegations of injuries sufficiently concrete to confer
standing to sue. 115 In this analysis, the court first asked whether the statutory
provision at issue was established to protect a concrete interest, as opposed to
purely procedural rights, and, second, whether the specific procedural violations
alleged in the case actually harmed or presented a material risk of harm to those
interests. 116 The court determined that the protections given by the FCRA were
“‘real,’ rather than purely legal creations,” citing the legislative record
discussing how inaccuracies in consumer reports could harm consumers, the
importance of consumer reports in modern life (noting their use in employment
decisions, loan applications, and home purchases), as well as the fact that the
Supreme Court’s ruling in Spokeo did assume that false information in consumer
reports does at least have the potential to constitute a concrete harm. 117
On the second part of the analysis, whether the specific procedural violations
at hand actually harmed or presented a material risk of harm, the court held that
there was a material risk of harm. 118 The court noted the importance of the
“examination of the nature of the specific alleged reporting inaccuracies to
ensure that they raise a real risk of harm to the concrete interests that FCRA
protects.” 119 Citing the Supreme Court’s guidance that “it cannot be the case that
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.

Id. at 1550.
Id. at 1549.
Id. at 1549–50.
Spokeo, 136 S.Ct. at 1550.
Robins v. Spokeo, Inc., 867 F.3d 1108, 1118 (9th Cir. 2017).
Id. at 1113.
Id. at 1114 (citing Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1550).
Id. at 1116.
Id.
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every trivial or meaningless inaccuracy” presents a real risk of harm, the court
held that the specific procedural violations at issue—the publication by Spokeo
on the Internet of multiple inaccuracies about the plaintiff, including his wealth
level, marital status, age range, field of employment, and educational status—
constituted a real risk of harm to the concrete interests protected by the FCRA. 120
Thus, the court concluded, there was standing to sue. 121
The Supreme Court’s guidance from Spokeo on what constitutes a concrete
injury, and the framework for the proper analysis of concreteness, informs much
of the subsequent BIPA litigation in federal courts.
B.

Federal Jurisdiction in BIPA Class-Action Suits

Generally, federal BIPA cases are large class action suits brought by Illinois
plaintiffs against out-of-state companies who use biometrics. 122 This provides
the diversity required for the federal courts to have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1332; however, the diversity jurisdiction statute also requires the matter in
controversy be in excess of $75,000 exclusive of interest and costs.123 Although
this depends on the number of times the defendant made unauthorized
collections of the plaintiff’s biometric information (committed a BIPA
violation)—given that BIPA only provides for liquidated damages of $1,000 per
negligent violation and $5,000 per intentional or reckless violation—there
would need to be 75 instances of negligent violations at $1,000 each, or 15
instances of intentional or reckless violations at $5,000 each, for an individual
plaintiff’s case to meet the amount-in-controversy requirement necessary for
federal jurisdiction under section 1332.
Thus, most BIPA suits arrive in federal court based on diversity jurisdiction
and the Class Action Fairness Act (“CAFA”). 124 CAFA calls for minimal
120. Robins, 867 F.3d at 1116–17.
121. Id. at 1118.
122. For example, in Patel v. Facebook, the plaintiffs were residents and citizens of Illinois,
while the defendant, Facebook, was a Delaware corporation with its headquarters and principal
place of business in California. See Consolidated Class Action Complaint, Licata v. Facebook, Inc.,
No. 3:15-cv-03747-JD (N.D. Cal. Aug. 28, 2015), 2015 WL 13691679. Similarly, in Rivera v.
Google, the representative plaintiff was a resident and citizen of Illinois and the defendant, Google,
was a Delaware corporation with its headquarters in California. See First Amended Class Action
Complaint, Weiss v. Google Inc., No. 1:16-cv-02714 (N.D. Ill. May 27, 2016), 2016 WL 3438680.
In Santana v. Take-Two Interactive Software, the defendant Take-Two was a Delaware corporation
with its headquarters and principal place of business in New York, while the plaintiffs were
residents and citizens of Illinois. See Second Amended Class Action Complaint, Vigil v. Take-Two
Interactive Software, Inc., No. 1:15-cv-08211-JGK (S.D.N.Y. July 15, 2016), 2016 WL 3965052.
123. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) (2018).
124. Id. § 1332(d); see, e.g., Rogers v. CSX Intermodal Terminals, Inc., 409 F. Supp. 3d 612,
614 (N.D. Ill 2019) (stating that the case was initially filed in the Circuit Court of Cook County
and that “[defendant] then removed the case to [federal district] court based on diversity jurisdiction
and the Class Action Fairness Act”).
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diversity, requiring only any member of a class of plaintiffs to be a citizen of a
state different from any defendant, 125 and requires the matter in controversy to
exceed the sum or value of $5,000,000, exclusive of interest and costs. 126 Under
CAFA, the claims of each individual class member are aggregated to determine
whether the matter in controversy exceeds the sum of value of five million
dollars. 127 To show whether removal to federal court is proper, a defendant must
only convince the federal court that, by the preponderance of the evidence, the
amount in controversy meets the five million dollar threshold. 128 Once removed
to federal court, cases are only remanded back to state court if it can be
demonstrated that it is impossible for the plaintiff to recover at least the amount
of the amount-in-controversy requirement. 129
By proposing a plaintiff class of Illinois residents who are users of large
technology services such as Google or Facebook, or are employees of large
employers who use biometric information in the workplace, the liquidated
damages BIPA provides for quickly reach the five million dollar amount-incontroversy minimum—allowing for federal jurisdiction under CAFA. 130 The
District Court for the Northern District of California, in its order certifying a
class of plaintiffs suing Facebook for BIPA damages, noted that the Act’s
liquidated damages “are not enough to incentivize individual plaintiffs given the
high costs of pursuing discovery on [the defendant] and . . . willingness [of the
defendant, a large multinational corporation,] to litigate.” 131 Thus, CAFA
provides the basis for federal jurisdiction in most federal BIPA litigation.
C. A Brief History of the Circuit Split
Over the last several years, a conflict among federal courts has arisen
regarding what constitutes standing to sue for BIPA litigants. In Patel, a 2019
Ninth Circuit decision, the plaintiff alleged BIPA violations based on
Facebook’s photo-tagging feature, which scans photos uploaded to Facebook for
faces of other Facebook users, and suggests the uploader to “tag” those users

125. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(2)(A) (2018).
126. Id. § 1332(d)(2).
127. Id. § 1332(d)(6).
128. Id. § 1446(c)(2)(B).
129. Spivey v. Vertrue, Inc., 528 F.3d 982, 986 (7th Cir. 2008) (“Once the proponent of federal
jurisdiction has explained plausibly how much the stakes exceed five million dollars, then the case
belongs in federal court unless it is legally impossible for the plaintiff to recover that much.”).
130. See, e.g., Peatry v. Bimbo Bakeries USA, Inc., 393 F. Supp. 3d 766, 769 (N.D. Ill. 2019)
(“[Defendant] claims that the Court has jurisdiction under CAFA, with a class of at least 300
members needing to only scan their fingerprints four times each to exceed CAFA’s five-milliondollar amount in controversy requirement”).
131. In re Facebook Biometric Information Privacy Litigation, 326 F.R.D. 535, 548 (N.D. Cal.
2018).
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identified in the photo. 132 Ultimately, the court rejected Facebook’s claim that
the plaintiffs failed to allege a concrete injury-in-fact. 133
This conflicts with the Second Circuit’s ruling in Santana v. Take-Two
Software, Inc., an unpublished 2017 case in which the court reviewed the district
court’s dismissal for lack of Article III standing. 134 The Second Circuit upheld
the district court’s dismissal, finding that the plaintiffs “failed to show a ‘real
risk of harm’ sufficient to confer an injury-in-fact.” 135
At the time of the Patel ruling, the Seventh Circuit had not weighed in on
BIPA standing in any cases involving consumer services. It had, however, found
Article III standing in an employment context in Miller v. Southwest Airlines
Co. 136 On the other hand, lower courts beneath the Seventh Circuit had, for the
most part, rejected finding standing for procedural BIPA violations, absent some
further harm, in both employment and consumer cases. 137 The Seventh Circuit
ruled on BIPA standing in a consumer context in Bryant v. Compass Group USA,
Inc., which involved vending machines which used fingerprint scanning to
identify the individual making the purchase for billing purposes. 138 Here, the
Seventh Circuit muddied the waters even further, agreeing with the Ninth Circuit
that procedural violations of BIPA’s notification and consent requirements 139
were sufficient to confer standing, 140 while a violation of the requirement to
disclose a deletion policy and retention schedule 141 was insufficient. 142
Following Bryant, the Seventh Circuit again ruled on BIPA in Fox v. Dakkota
Integrated Systems, a case brought against an employer by an employee where
132. Patel v. Facebook, Inc., 932 F.3d 1264, 1267–68 (9th Cir. 2019).
133. Id. at 1267.
134. 717 F. App’x. 12, 13–14 (2d Cir. 2017).
135. Id. at 17 (quoting Spokeo Inc., v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1549 (2016)).
136. 926 F.3d 898 (7th Cir. 2019)). This note explores this decision further in Section II.D.3.
137. See, e.g., Hunter v. Automated Health Sys., Inc., 2020 WL 833180 at *1–2 (N.D. Ill. Feb.
20, 2020) (Employee’s suit against employer alleging BIPA violations in employer’s use of
fingerprints for time tracking failed to allege a concrete injury); McGinnis v. United States Cold
Storage, Inc., 382 F. Supp. 3d 813, 815-16 (N.D. Ill. 2019) (BIPA suit brought by employee against
employer alleging noncompliant use of fingerprints for time tracking dismissed for failing to allege
a concrete injury); Rivera v. Google, 366 F. Supp. 3d 998, 1001, 1014 (N.D. Ill. 2018) (BIPA suit
brought by consumers against technology company for noncompliant use of face scans in social
media product dismissed because plaintiffs had not suffered concrete injuries); McCullough v.
Smarte Carte, Inc., 2016 WL 4077108 at *1, *4 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 1, 2016) (consumer who brought
suit against locker rental company for BIPA violations in use of fingerprints had no concrete injury
sufficient to satisfy Article III standing); but see Figueroa v. Kronos Inc., 2020 WL 1848206 (N.D.
Ill. Apr. 13, 2020) (plaintiffs sufficiently alleged a concrete informational injury to confer Article
III standing).
138. 958 F.3d 617, 619 (7th Cir. 2020).
139. 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 14/15(b) (2018).
140. Bryant, 958 F.3d at 626.
141. 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 14/15(a) (2018).
142. Bryant, 958 F.3d at 626.
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the court found standing for allegations of failure to develop, adhere to, or
disclose a deletion policy and retention schedule, 143 and Thornley v. Clearview
AI, where it found insufficient standing for federal jurisdiction in alleged
violations of BIPA’s ban on profit from or sale of biometrics. 144
D. Cases Involving Standing
1.

Santana v. Take-Two Software

Santana vs. Take-Two Software, Inc. is one of the earlier BIPA cases, having
been heard by the Second Circuit in 2017. 145 The case was an appeal by the
plaintiffs of the district court’s decision to grant the defendant’s motion to
dismiss. 146 The plaintiffs alleged that the defendant, a video game publisher,
failed to gather consent to collect and disseminate their biometric information,
to provide the proper notice required by BIPA as to the purpose of the collection
and the duration of retention of the biometric data, and to protect their biometric
data using a reasonable standard of care in storage and transmission. 147 The case
centered around the “MyPlayer” feature found in two of Take-Two’s “NBA
2K15” and “NBA 2K16” video games. 148 The feature allowed players to create
an avatar in the game whose face was a realistic version of their own. 149 To
utilize this feature, players first were required to agree to Take-Two’s terms and
conditions, 150 then placed their faces approximately one foot away from a
camera while slowly turning their heads to the left and right for about fifteen
minutes, allowing the game to scan the facial geometry necessary to create their
personalized avatar. 151
The plaintiffs, players of NBA 2K15 who used the MyPlayer feature,
brought five claims under BIPA that can be grouped into three distinct
violations: consent, notice, and security. The consent claims alleged that the
defendant both collected the plaintiffs’ biometric data and disseminated it to
others without consent. 152 The notice claims alleged violations of BIPA’s
requirements to inform (in writing) the purpose of biometric collection, length
the data will be stored, and to maintain a publicly-available schedule detailing
143. 980 F.3d 1146, 1148–49 (7th Cir. 2020).
144. 984 F.3d 1241, 1242 (7th Cir. 2021).
145. 717 F. App’x. 12, 12 (2d Cir. 2017).
146. Id. at 14–15.
147. Id. at 14.
148. Id. at 13.
149. Id.
150. The terms and conditions stated: “Your face scan will be visible to you and others you
play with and may be recorded or screen captured during gameplay. By proceeding you agree and
consent to such uses and other uses pursuant to the End User License Agreement. www.take2
games.com/eula.” Santana, 717 F. App’x. at 13–14.
151. Id. at 14.
152. Id. at 13.
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the retention and permanent destruction of the data. 153 Finally, the security claim
alleged Take-Two’s failure to protect the plaintiffs’ biometric data with a
reasonable standard of care as stringently as it protects other confidential or
sensitive information, as required under BIPA. 154
To determine whether there was Article III standing for a procedural
violation of a statute, the court first reviewed the scope and purpose of the
procedural right provided by the statute. The court assumed (without deciding)
that “BIPA’s purpose is to prevent the unauthorized use, collection, or disclosure
of an individual’s biometric data,” identifying this purpose—the prevention of
the unauthorized use, collection, or disclosure of biometric data—as the concrete
interest protected by the statute. 155 This is similar to the court below, which
found that “[t]he only concrete interest protected by the BIPA is biometric data
protection.” 156 Therefore, to find Article III standing, the court stated that the
plaintiffs must prove that either “their biometric data [was] collected or
disseminated without their authorization or . . . a procedural violation creates a
material risk of such an outcome.” 157
Next, the court examined whether any of the alleged procedural BIPA
violations raised a material risk of harm to the plaintiffs’ interests (i.e., if the
plaintiffs’ “biometric data [was] collected or disseminated without their
authorization or if a procedural violation creates a material risk of such an
outcome”). 158 The court quickly dismissed the allegations that BIPA’s consent
provisions were violated and held that the Take-Two’s terms and conditions
were sufficient under the circumstances to meet BIPA’s requirement that
individuals be informed in writing that their biometric information was being
collected or stored. 159 The plaintiffs were required to agree to these terms to
move forward and their participation in the relatively laborious, fifteen-minutelong face scan following that agreement further demonstrated their consent. 160
Because they were unable to demonstrate that the allegedly flawed terms and
conditions caused them to consent to biometric collection where they otherwise
would not have, the court found they had failed to allege a material risk of harm
to their concrete interests here.

153. Id. at 13.
154. Id. at 13.
155. Santana, 717 F. App’x. at 15.
156. Virgil v. Take-Two Interactive Software, Inc., 235 F. Supp. 3d 499, 514 (S.D.N.Y. 2017).
157. Santana, 717 F. App’x. at 15.
158. Id.
159. Id. at 15–16. The terms and conditions for the MyPlayer feature referred to a “face scan”
while BIPA defined a biometric identifier as a “scan of . . . face geometry” in § 14/10. Presumably,
the court reasoned that including the word “geometry” so that the terms and conditions referred to
a “face geometry scan” would have made the written consent more clearly compliant with the Act.
See id. at 15.
160. Id. at 15–16.
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Examining the notice claims, which alleged that Take-Two did not inform
the plaintiffs of the duration for which it would store their biometric data or
maintain a schedule for the data’s retention and destruction, the court again
found no risk of material harm to the plaintiffs’ interests. While Take-Two may
not have stated how long the biometric information would be stored, the court
held that there was no allegation that they would not destroy the data as
required. 161 The court further found that despite Take-Two’s failure to post a
schedule of biometric data retention and destruction, the plaintiffs “do not allege
that Take-Two lacks such protocols, that its policies are inadequate, or that TakeTwo is unlikely to abide by its internal procedures.” 162 The court essentially
concurred with the district court, which succinctly summarized its finding that
procedural violations are not sufficient to constitute an injury-in-fact, stating that
“a private entity may destroy biometrics pursuant to the requirements set forth
in section 15(a), and thus effectively comply with the core data protection goal
of the BIPA while also technically violating the BIPA by failing to publish a
retention schedule.” 163
Finally, the court was left with the security claim, the allegations that TakeTwo violated BIPA’s data security provisions, which it stated “raise a somewhat
thornier issue.” 164 The plaintiffs alleged that their face scans were sent
unencrypted via the open Internet—i.e., not via a secure, private network—in
violation of BIPA’s requirement to use a reasonable standard of care to protect
biometric data in an entity’s possession. 165 The court below rejected this
argument, stating that while Take-Two may not have taken the steps to meet the
requirements of BIPA in its storage and transmission of the biometrics, the
allegations “[did] not establish an imminent risk that [the plaintiffs’] biometrics
could actually be misused, and there has been no event, such as [a] data theft . . .
that could make any such risk rise above the abstract level.” 166 The trial court
found this to be too abstract and speculative to confer standing. 167 The district
court further rejected the argument that the harms involved with face scans are
greater because they are unchangeable, unlike other information such as
passwords, stating that the “hypothetical magnitude” of an injury that is still
“highly speculative and abstract” and “not certainly impending” does not change

161. Santana, 717 F. App’x. at 16. BIPA calls for destruction of an individual’s biometric data
when the initial purpose for collecting the data has been satisfied or 3 years after the individual’s
last interaction with the entity collecting the biometric data, whichever occurs first. 740 ILL COMP.
STAT. § 14/15(a) (2018).
162. Santana, 717 F. App’x. at 16.
163. Virgil v. Take-Two Interactive Software, Inc., 235 F. Supp. 3d 499, 514 (S.D.N.Y. 2017).
164. Santana, 717 F. App’x. at 16.
165. Id. at 17.
166. Virgil, 235 F. Supp. 3d at 511.
167. Id. at 512.
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the analysis. 168 On appeal, the Second Circuit declined to engage in a similarly
deep analysis on the security claim. It did, however, disagree with the defense’s
assertion that there is only standing when there has been an actual data breach. 169
It again found that the plaintiffs failed to show a real risk of harm sufficient to
constitute an injury-in-fact, and affirmed the district court’s dismissal for lack
of Article III standing. 170
2.

Patel v. Facebook

In Patel v. Facebook, Inc., the Ninth Circuit heard an appeal of a district
court decision granting class certification against the plaintiffs, Illinois
Facebook users, who brought a putative class action suit against the social
networking giant Facebook alleging BIPA violations. 171 The Ninth Circuit, like
the Second Circuit in Santana, applied the Spokeo guidance using a two-step
approach to determine whether the violation of a statute causes a concrete
injury. 172 The court asked (1) whether the statutory provisions at issue were
established to protect the plaintiff’s concrete interests (as opposed to purely
procedural rights) and, if so, (2) whether the specific procedural violations
alleged in the case constituted actual harm, or presented a material risk of harm
to such interests. 173 Unlike the Second Circuit, the Ninth Circuit found that the
Patel plaintiffs had alleged a concrete and particularized harm sufficient to
confer Article III standing. 174
In Patel, the defendant’s alleged BIPA violations involved the “tag
suggestions” feature on Facebook, which was launched in 2010. 175 If tag
suggestions are enabled, when a user uploads a photo, facial recognition
technology is employed to analyze the faces in that photo to determine whether
they match any of the user’s friends’ faces. 176 This is accomplished by detecting
images of faces in the photo, extracting the facial geometry of those faces, and
comparing each face to Facebook’s database of user face templates. 177 If there
is a match, Facebook suggests the user tag that person in the photo. 178 While
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.

Id.
Santana, 717 F. App’x. at 16.
Id. at 16–17.
932 F.3d 1264, 1268–70 (9th Cir. 2019).
Id. at 1270–71.
Id. at 1270–71.
Id. at 1275.
Id. at 1268.
Sriivas Narayanan, An Update About Face Recognition on Facebook, FACEBOOK
NEWSROOM (Sept. 3, 2019), https://about.fb.com/news/2019/09/update-face-recognition/
[https://perma.cc/EQ4A-TW5S].
177. Patel v. Facebook, Inc., 932 F.3d 1264, 1268 (9th Cir. 2019).
178. Blake Montgomery, Facebook Makes Facial Recognition Opt-In Instead of Automatically
Scanning Users’ Faces, THE DAILY BEAST (Sept. 03, 2019), https://www.thedailybeast.com/face
book-makes-facial-recognition-opt-in-gets-rid-of-tag-suggestions-system?ref=scroll
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users could disable the “tag suggestions” feature, there was no information on
the Facebook website that indicated that this could or would stop Facebook from
collecting and using facial recognition data. 179 The “tag suggestions” feature has
since been eliminated from Facebook, having been replaced in 2019 by a feature
termed “face recognition” by Facebook that utilizes facial recognition to alert
users if their profile photo is used by someone else or if they appear in photos in
which they are not tagged. 180 “Face recognition” also continues to suggest users
tag friends when they upload a photo, just as “tag suggestions” did, but the new
feature allows users to opt-out, in which case Facebook will not store their face
template nor use facial recognition to identify them in photos. 181 Illinois
Facebook users brought suit, alleging Facebook collected, used, and stored their
biometric identifiers—scans of their face geometry—without securing a written
release or posting a compliant retention schedule for the biometric identifiers, in
violation of BIPA. 182
To begin its analysis, the court—similarly to the Santana court—considered
whether the BIPA provisions at issue protect a concrete interest or mere
procedural rights. 183 To do so, the court first embarked on a brief history of the
protection of privacy by the law in both American and English courts, noting
that “common law privacy rights are intertwined with constitutionally protected
zones of privacy.” 184 The court then detailed the Supreme Court’s recent
jurisprudence on the potential of new technologies to violate privacy rights and
discussed the Illinois General Assembly’s intent when BIPA was introduced. 185
Ultimately, the court concluded that BIPA protects individuals’ concrete interest
in privacy. 186 This is notably broader than the Santana court’s determination that
the concrete interest protected by BIPA is an individual’s interest in preventing

[https://perma.cc/4EN3-Q5QF]. A tag identifies the friend in the photo by name and includes a link
to that friend’s Facebook profile. What is Tagging and How Does it Work?, FACEBOOK HELP
CENTER, https://www.facebook.com/help/124970597582337?helpref=uf_permalink [https://per
ma.cc/C8B3-VSJ4].
179. Thomas Germain, Facebook Updates Facial Recognition Settings After CR Investigation,
CONSUMER REPORTS (Sept. 03, 2019), https://www.consumerreports.org/privacy/facebook-up
dates-facial-recognition-setting/ [https://perma.cc/ALL4-MJDH].
180. Jon Swartz, Facebook Makes Face Recognition Available to All Users, Spikes Tag
Suggestions, MARKETWATCH (Sept. 3, 2019), https://www.marketwatch.com/story/facebookmakes-face-recognition-available-to-all-users-spikes-tag-suggestions-2019-09-03 [https://perma
.cc/ZB6Y-N3FZ].
181. What is the Face Recognition Setting on Facebook and How Does it Work?, FACEBOOK
HELP
CENTER,
https://www.facebook.com/help/122175507864081?helpref=faq_content
[https://perma.cc/95FM-47YL].
182. Patel v. Facebook, Inc., 932 F.3d 1264, 1268 (9th Cir. 2019).
183. Id. at 1271.
184. Id. at 1272.
185. Id. at 1272–74.
186. Id. at 1274.
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the unauthorized collection, use, or dissemination of their biometric data,
because the Ninth Circuit frames the interest as maintaining privacy, versus
merely preventing violations of privacy.
In the second part of the analysis, determining whether the procedural
violations actually harmed or presented a material risk of harm to the concrete
interest at play, the Patel court again differed from the Santana court. The court
characterized the privacy right that BIPA protects as “the right not to be subject
to the collection and use of . . . biometric data.” 187 Therefore, the court reasoned,
because the allegations were that Facebook collected, used, and stored such
biometric data without following the procedures required by the statute, a failure
to follow these procedures must violate the substantive privacy interests of the
plaintiffs, representing sufficient concreteness to confer Article III standing. 188
This appears directly in conflict with the Santana court’s decision that
standing requires some other non-abstract harm or material risk of harm to a
concrete interest beyond the statutory violation itself. This conflict stems from
the differing conclusions each court reaches in identifying the concrete interest
protected by BIPA. The concrete interest found by the Second Circuit, the
interest in preventing the unauthorized collection, use, or disclosure of biometric
data, is more difficult to allege as a violation because a plaintiff must allege not
merely a procedural or technical violation of the statute but an actual, or material
risk of, unauthorized collection, use, or disclosure of his biometric data in order
to have standing. On the other hand, the broader concrete interest found by the
Ninth Circuit to be protected by BIPA—the interest in one’s privacy—is easier
to allege as a procedural violation because any failure to adhere to a statutory
provision must then harm the concrete interest in privacy protected by the
provision.
Facebook appealed the Ninth Circuit’s decision to the Supreme Court,
arguing that review was warranted due to the deepened circuit split on
standing. 189 The Supreme Court, however, denied certiorari in January 2020. 190
Out of options, Facebook settled the suit for $550 million, 191 an amount which
ultimately grew to $650 million by the time the settlement received court

187. Patel, 932 F.3d at 1274.
188. Id.
189. See Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 6, Facebook, Inc. v. Patel, No. 19-706, 2019 WL
6640455 (U.S. Dec. 2, 2019).
190. See Facebook, Inc. v. Patel, No. 19-706, 2020 WL 283288 (Mem) (U.S. Jan. 21, 2020).
191. Natasha Singer & Mike Isaac, Facebook to Pay $550 Million to Settle Facial Recognition
Suit, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 29, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/01/29/technology/facebookprivacy-lawsuit-earnings.html [https://perma.cc/8ATZ-5KPC].
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approval. 192 This settlement led commentators to note the effectiveness of BIPA
in protecting consumer privacy rights. 193
3.

Miller v. Southwest Airlines

At the time of the Patel decision, the Seventh Circuit had only ruled on
standing in BIPA litigation in an employment case, Miller v. Southwest Airlines,
where it affirmed the district court’s finding that the plaintiffs had Article III
standing but primarily focused its analysis on jurisdictional concerns. 194 In
Miller, a consolidated appeal of two cases, one brought against United Airlines
by its employees and another against Southwest Airlines by its employees, the
plaintiff-employees alleged violations of BIPA in the airlines’ use of
timekeeping systems that required employees to scan their fingerprints in order
to clock in and out of work. 195 The plaintiffs alleged that the employers did not
receive employees’ consent to use their biometric information, as required by
section 15(b)(3) of the Act, nor did they publish a publicly-available policy
regarding the retention and destruction of biometric identifiers and information,
as required by section 15(a). 196 Further, the airlines allegedly used third-party
vendors to manage their timekeeping systems, which was an alleged disclosure
prohibited by section 15(e)(1), 197 which requires entities in possession of
biometric identifiers or biometric information to “protect [the biometric
identifier or biometric information] from disclosure.” 198 At the district court
level, the two suits were assigned to different judges, one of whom found the
plaintiffs to have standing under Article III, while the other remanded the case
to state court, noting that the “complaint did not present a case or controversy,
because the class asserted only a bare procedural right.” 199
Though the reasoning is only applicable in employment cases involving
specific federally-regulated industries, the Seventh Circuit held that plaintiffs
had standing to sue and that the use of fingerprint identification for timekeeping
amounted to a material change in the unionized workers’ terms and conditions
192. Jake Holland, Facebook’s $650 Million Privacy Settlement Approved by Judge,
BLOOMBERG LAW (Feb. 26, 2021, 3:23 PM), https://www.bloomberglaw.com/bloomberglawnews
/privacy-and-data-security/X40VSPS8000000 [https://perma.cc/N3RT-B4JA].
193. See Allison Grande, Record Facebook Deal May Boost US Privacy Law Push, LAW360
(Jan. 31, 2020, 9:35 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/1239728/ [https://perma.cc/SUN3BJZF]. This includes the federal judge overseeing the settlement, who noted that Facebook’s
“settlement is a major win for consumers in the hotly contested area of digital privacy.” In re
Facebook Biometric Information Privacy Litigation, No. 15-cv-03747-JD, 2021 WL 757025, at *1
(N.D. Cal. Feb. 26, 2021).
194. 926 F.3d 898, 905 (7th Cir. 2019).
195. Id. at 900–01.
196. Id. at 901.
197. Id.
198. 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 14/15(e)(1) (2018).
199. Miller, 926 F.3d at 902.
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of employment that satisfied the concreteness requirement of Article III,
allowing a court or adjustment board to order changes in clocking in and out if
they were to find that the unions had not consented. 200 The court proceeded to
analyze the plaintiffs’ allegations that the carriers were not following the Act’s
data-retention and destruction procedures and were using third-party vendors. 201
Noting that “the longer data are retained, and the more people have access, the
greater the risk of disclosure,” the court emphasized that there was no indication
that the data had, in fact, reached any malevolent third party, and declined to
reach a conclusion on whether “risk of disclosure itself suffices for standing,”
leaving the question unresolved. 202
4.

Bryant v. Compass Group USA

In Bryant v. Compass Group USA, the Seventh Circuit joined the Ninth and
Second Circuits in ruling on a BIPA claim in a consumer context: this case
involved the defendant vending machine operator’s alleged use of the plaintiff’s
fingerprints in violation of BIPA. 203 The vending machine, available at
plaintiff’s workplace, did not accept cash and instead required users to establish
an account using a fingerprint to authenticate their identity. 204 Using their
fingerprints, employees could purchase items and add money to their
accounts. 205
The plaintiff alleged several violations: 1) the defendant failed to inform
users that their biometric identifiers (fingerprints) were being collected or stored;
2) the defendant failed to inform users of the purpose and length of the term of
the collection; and 3) the defendant failed to obtain a written release to collect,
store, and use the fingerprints. 206 Interestingly, the plaintiff made clear that this
was a suit alleging a bare procedural violation: the court noted that “Bryant [did]
not assert that she did not know that her fingerprint was being collected and
stored, nor why this was happening,” merely that the defendant failed to comply
with the provisions of the Act which resulted in “the loss of [her] right to control
[her] biometric identifiers and information.” 207
The plaintiff brought a putative class action in Illinois state court, at which
point the defendant removed the action to federal court under CAFA, on the
basis of diversity of citizenship (the defendant being a Delaware corporation
with its principal place of business in North Carolina, and the plaintiff being a
citizen of Illinois) and an amount in controversy of over five million dollars (the
200.
201.
202.
203.
204.
205.
206.
207.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 902–03.
958 F. 3d 617, 620 (7th Cir. 2020).
Id. at 619.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 620.
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defendant asserted that the class had at least 1,000 members, each of whom
would be authorized under BIPA for statutory damages of $5,000 per intentional
or reckless violation). 208
The court first applied Spokeo and concluded that “[a] direct application of
Spokeo . . . leads to the result that [the plaintiff] satisfied the injury-in-fact
requirement of Article III.” 209 Because the case asserted a violation of the
plaintiff’s rights in “her fingerprints, her private information,” 210 the defendant’s
failure to adhere to BIPA’s requirements constituted an invasion of the
plaintiff’s private domain similar to an act of trespass, satisfying Spokeo’s
requirement that a plaintiff allege a concrete and particularized harm to possess
Article III standing. 211
The court also analyzed the case “as a type of informational injury,” where
it also found standing. 212 It first examined its recent decision in Groshek v. Time
Warner Cable, where the prospective employee sued because the employer
failed to give applicants a stand-alone written disclosure that a consumer report
may be obtained, in violation of the FCRA. 213 The disclosure was instead
contained on a document alongside other information. 214 Because the Groshek
plaintiff did not allege he was not able to give knowing and informed consent
due to the disclosure not being a stand-alone document, the Seventh Circuit held
he did not allege a concrete injury. 215
The court then contrasted Groshek with its decision in Robertson v. Allied
Solutions, LLC, where a company failed to provide a prospective employee with
a copy of her consumer report before it rescinded her employment offer because
of information contained in the report. 216 This was sufficient to constitute an
injury-in-fact to sue under the FCRA because the plaintiff “was wholly deprived
of the information necessary to respond in the way FCRA contemplated.” 217
The injury alleged in the Bryant case, the court reasoned, was quite similar
to that alleged in Robertson. 218 The defendant’s failure to adhere to BIPA’s
requirements “denied [the plaintiff] and others like her the opportunity to
consider whether the terms of [the] collection and usage [of fingerprints] were

208. Bryant, 958 F. 3d at 620.
209. Id. at 624.
210. Id.
211. See id.
212. Id.
213. Bryant, 958 F. 3d at 625 (citing Groshek v. Time Warner Cable, 865 F.3d 884, 886 (7th
Cir. 2017)).
214. Id. (citing Groshek, 865 F.3d at 886).
215. Groshek, 865 F.3d at 889.
216. Bryant, 958 F.3d at 625 (citing Robertson v. Allied Solutions, LLC, 902 F.3d 690, 696
(7th Cir. 2018)).
217. Id.
218. Id. at 626.
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acceptable given the attendant risks.” 219 Thus, the defendant’s violation of BIPA
section 15(b) went beyond a purely procedural requirement in that it withheld
substantive information from the plaintiff, depriving her of the ability to make
informed consent. 220
The Seventh Circuit, however, did not join the Ninth Circuit in finding
standing for a violation of BIPA section 15(a), the provision of BIPA that
requires companies to have a publicly available policy concerning their retention
of biometric information as well as a deletion schedule. 221 It held that this is a
duty “owed to the public generally, not to particular persons whose biometric
information the entity collects.” 222 Thus, it did not form part of BIPA’s
“informed-consent regime” and the plaintiff did not allege any particularized
harm from this violation, meaning she lacked standing under Article III to bring
suit in federal court for that claim. 223
While the Bryant decision may have given weight (in light of the Ninth
Circuit’s Patel ruling) to the theory that procedural violations of BIPA section
15(b) concerning notification and consent are sufficient to confer federal
standing, Bryant differed from Patel in that it distinguished BIPA section 15(a)
(concerning destruction and retention schedules) where it did not find standing
for mere procedural violations. The Patel decision only held that alleged
violations of section 15 more broadly, without differentiating between the
different subsections, were sufficient to confer standing. 224 However, it is
important to note that the Bryant plaintiff’s allegation of a BIPA section 15(a)
violation was limited to the defendant’s failure to develop a written schedule of
retention and deletion available to the public. 225 The Seventh Circuit, stating its
“analysis [was] limited to the theory [the plaintiff] invoked,” explicitly did not
rule on standing based on a defendant’s alleged violation of section 15(a)’s
requirement for compliance with its already-established retention and deletion
schedules, thus leaving the door open for potential additional routes to standing
in future cases. 226
5.

Fox v. Dakkota Integrated Systems

The continuing surge in BIPA class action claims 227 quickly provided the
Seventh Circuit with several cases following Bryant that allowed the court to
219.
220.
221.
222.
223.
224.
225.
226.
227.
Camille

Id.
Id.
Bryant, 958 F.3d at 626.
Id.
Id.
See Patel v. Facebook, Inc., 932 F.3d 1264, 1274–75 (9th Cir. 2019).
Bryant, 958 F.3d at 626.
Id.
See Maatman, Jr. et al., supra note 69; see also Tiffany Cheung, Michael Burshteyn, &
Framroze, Privacy Litigation 2020 Year in Review: BIPA Litigation, MORRISON
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expand its BIPA jurisprudence. The first came in Fox v. Dakkota Integrated
Systems. 228 The Fox plaintiff alleged that her employer violated BIPA by
requiring employees to use biometric information (fingerprints) to clock in and
out of work. 229 The plaintiff alleged her employer did not receive her written
consent to collect the biometric information, in violation of BIPA section 15(b),
and that it did not receive her written consent when it disseminated her biometric
information to the third-party company that managed the time-keeping software
and the storage of the time records in a database, in violation of section 15(d). 230
Additionally, the Fox plaintiff alleged violations of section 15(a) that were
broader than those alleged in Bryant: here, the plaintiff did not just allege a
failure to disclose a data-retention policy, but also alleged the defendant failed
to even develop a data-retention policy and that it failed to comply with a dataretention policy and guidelines to permanently destroy the biometric information
once it was no longer needed. 231
These allegations allowed the court to continue its Article III standing
discussion regarding BIPA’s requirements to develop, comply with, and make
publicly available a data-retention schedule right where Bryant left off: while
the Bryant court held that the bare allegation of failing to publicly disclose a
data-retention schedule publicly was insufficient to confer Article III standing
to sue for BIPA section 15(a) violations, 232 what about allegations of failure to
develop and comply with a data-retention policy? That is what was alleged in
Fox. 233
In Fox, the court ruled that the 15(a) allegations were sufficient to confer
Article III standing, 234 stating that “[t]he BIPA requirement to implement data
retention and destruction protocols protects a person’s biometric privacy just as
FOERSTER (Jan. 12, 2021), https://www.mofo.com/resources/insights/210111-bipa-litigation.html
[https://perma.cc/YG72-KWGD] (“In 2020, at least 54 court rulings referenced BIPA. This is more
than double 2019’s count.”); Marsh, supra note 97 (noting that, as of November 2020, there have
already been 58 federal complaints alleging BIPA claims in 2020, more than 2018 and 2019
combined).
228. 980 F.3d 1146, 1146 (7th Cir. 2020).
229. Id. at 1149–50.
230. Id. at 1150. Because the Fox plaintiff was represented by a union, her claims alleging
violations of BIPA sections 15(b) and 15(d) were preempted by the Labor Management Relations
Act and dismissed by the district court; the appellate court’s decision focused on the Article III
standing of the plaintiff’s 15(a) claim. Id. at 1150–51.
231. Id. at 1150.
232. Bryant v. Compass Group USA, Inc., 958 F.3d 617, 626 (7th Cir. 2020).
233. See Class Action Complaint at 16-17, Fox v. Dakkota Integrated Systems, LLC, No. 1:19cv-02872 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 29, 2019), ECF No. 1-1, 2020 WL 8409682 (alleging that the defendant
failed to comply with BIPA’s mandate to establish, comply with, and make publicly available a
schedule for retention and deletion of biometric data, that it does not have any retention schedule
or deletion guideline for biometric data, and that it had not and would never destroy the plaintiff’s
biometric data in its possession).
234. Fox, 980 F.3d at 1156.
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concretely as the statute’s informed consent regime.” 235 Given that it had held
in Bryant that violations of this informed-consent regime, found in BIPA section
15(b), represented a concrete and particularized injury sufficient to confer
standing, 236 it reasoned that the Fox plaintiff’s allegations of unlawful retention
of biometric data was an injury equally concrete and particularized as the
unlawful collection of biometrics. 237 The court noted that the 15(a) violations
alleged in Bryant were “extremely narrow” while the Fox plaintiff’s 15(a) claim
was “much broader.” 238 This distinction will likely be important for BIPA suits
going forward—alleging that a defendant failed to publicly disclose a dataretention policy and destruction schedule for biometric data is not enough; under
the Seventh Circuit’s Fox reasoning, plaintiffs must also allege the defendant
failed to develop such a policy and failed to adhere to it.
The court also differentiated between biometric identifiers and other
consumer data (such as telephone, credit card, and social security numbers) at
issue in past cases involving procedural violations of statutes, noting that
biometrics are immutable and thus inherently sensitive. 239 Thus, a violation of
BIPA section 15(a) by failing to delete biometrics as required by the law is
“closely analogous to historical claims for privacy.” 240 The court reversed the
district court’s remand order, allowing the 15(a) claims to be litigated in federal
court. 241
6.

Thornley v. Clearview AI

The next BIPA case considered by the Seventh Circuit, Thornley v.
Clearview AI, Inc., 242 arrived before the court with the plaintiff arguing against
her own federal standing and the defendant advocating for the plaintiff’s
standing to sue, “for reasons that only a civil procedure buff could love.” 243 The
facts of the case concern Clearview AI’s facial recognition tool that harvests
publicly-available pictures from social media sites in order to develop biometric
facial scans of individuals that it then stores on a database. 244 Clearview AI’s
business is centered around selling access to its facial-recognition technology,
which allows its customers (mostly law enforcement agencies) to identify
unknown persons in photographs by uploading photographs to a Clearview
website, where Clearview’s facial-recognition technology creates a facial scan
235.
236.
237.
238.
239.
240.
241.
242.
243.
244.

Id. at 1155.
Bryant, 958 F.3d at 626–27.
Fox, 980 F.3d at 1154–55.
Id. at 1154.
Id. at 1155.
Id. (quoting Bryant, 958 F.3d at 623).
Id. at 1156.
984 F.3d 1241, 1241 (7th Cir. 2021).
Id. at 1242.
Id. at 1242–43.
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for the person in the photograph, compares this scan to the facial scans stored in
its database, and, if there is a match, directs the user to the social media profile
of the individual identified. 245
The procedural history of the case is quite interesting. The plaintiff filed the
class-action suit in Illinois state court, alleging violations of three BIPA
provisions. 246 Clearview removed the case to federal court, and shortly thereafter
the plaintiff voluntarily dismissed the suit. 247 The suit was then refiled in Illinois
state court, this time “significantly narrowed” in its claims: the plaintiff now
alleged only that Clearview violated BIPA’s section 15(c), banning private
entities from selling, leasing, trading, or profiting from biometric data, and
included a “much more modest” class definition. 248 In this new suit, the
plaintiff’s proposed class specified that it included only those “who suffered no
injury from Defendant’s violation of [s]ection 15(c) of BIPA other than statutory
aggrievement.” 249 Clearview again removed the case to federal court, where the
district court held there was no Article III standing and remanded the case to
state court. 250 Clearview appealed, resulting in the case before the Seventh
Circuit. 251
In its analysis of section 15(c), the court noted that the bare allegations of
the plaintiff “raised questions only about a general regulatory rule found in
BIPA.” 252 While Clearview urged the court to focus on the potential injury of
selling, leasing, profiting from a person’s biometric data, the court noted that
this was not the allegation in the actual complaint. 253 It noted that federal
standing could perhaps be found where a hypothetical plaintiff alleged 15(c)
violations and argued that a defendant “has deprived her of the opportunity to
profit from her biometric information.” 254 However, the court noted, in the
actual case at bar, the plaintiff alleged only a violation of a “general regulation”
245. Id. at 1243. For more information about Clearview’s business model and technology and
discussion of the company’s ramifications on society, see Kashmir Hill, The Secretive Company
That Might End Privacy as We Know It, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 18, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com
/2020/01/18/technology/clearview-privacy-facial-recognition.html [https://perma.cc/NFT3-G6FJ].
246. Thornley, 984 F.3d at 1243. The plaintiff alleged violations of sections 15(a), 15(b), and
15(c) of BIPA. Id. These provisions include the requirement to develop and make publicly available
retention schedules and destruction guidelines for biometric data (15(a)), the requirement to receive
a written release prior to the collection of biometric information (15(b)), and the ban on selling,
leasing, trading, or otherwise profiting from biometric data (15(c)). See 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 14/15
(2020).
247. Thornley, 984 F.3d at 1243.
248. Id.
249. Id. at 1246.
250. Id. at 1243.
251. Id. at 1242.
252. Thornley, 984 F.3d at 1246.
253. See id. at 1246–47.
254. Id. at 1247.
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found in BIPA, and, similar to the 15(a) claim made by the plaintiff in Bryant,
asserted no particularized injury. 255 Ultimately, the court concluded that while
the plaintiff clearly crafted the complaint to avoid federal court, plaintiffs are
allowed to do so, and because the complaint’s allegations described no
particularized or concrete injury, the case lacked the Article III standing required
to be pursued in federal court and the district court’s remand was proper. 256
The implications of this decision on BIPA litigation moving forward are
likely to be significant, as the court gave its stamp of approval to claims
deliberately crafted to avoid federal courts if the plaintiff so wishes.
Commentators have noted that the court has, essentially, provided plaintiffs with
a “road map” for avoiding federal courts: by “restricting [complaints] to bare
statutory violations,” plaintiffs can ensure their BIPA suits are litigated in
Illinois state courts. 257
III. POTENTIAL SUPREME COURT INTERPRETATION & ANALYSIS OF IMPACT
A.

Why the Court Should Find Standing for Procedural Violations

As of this writing, there is no BIPA litigation pending appeal to the Supreme
Court, as Facebook’s petition for writ of certiorari from the Ninth Circuit’s Patel
decision was denied by the Court, 258 though it appears likely that Clearview AI
will be appealing the Seventh Circuit’s Fox decision. 259 With the Seventh
Circuit’s ruling in Bryant, the pendulum seems to be swinging towards a more
permissive regime for finding Article III standing for statutory data-privacy
violations alone—at least in BIPA cases. Given the Court’s jurisprudence in
Spokeo, it seems that were it to resolve the circuit split on BIPA standing, it
would be appropriate for the Court to find Article III standing in situations
involving procedural violations of BIPA’s notification, consent, and disclosure
provisions.
There are two pertinent inquiries to make here. The first inquiry regards the
legislative intent behind the procedural rights BIPA established. In Spokeo, the
Court noted that when determining whether an intangible harm, such as a
procedural violation of BIPA, constitutes injury in fact, “both history and
judgment of Congress play important roles.” 260 Here, where a state law is at
issue, the judgment of the promulgating legislature should be examined. The
Second Circuit assumed “that BIPA’s purpose is to prevent the unauthorized
255. Id.
256. Id. at 1248–49.
257. See Marsh, supra note 97.
258. See Facebook, Inc. v. Patel, No. 19-706, 2020 WL 283288 (Mem) (U.S. Jan. 21, 2020).
259. See Clearview AI, Inc.’s Motion to Stay the Mandate Pending the Filing and Resolution
of a Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, Thornley v. Clearview AI, Inc., No 20-3249 (7th Cir. Feb. 22,
2021), ECF No. 47.
260. Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S.Ct. 1540, 1549 (2016).
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use, collection, or disclosure of an individual’s biometric data.” 261 The Ninth
Circuit, on the other hand, determined that “the statutory provisions at issue in
BIPA were established to protect an individual’s ‘concrete interests’ in privacy,
not merely procedural rights.” 262 Similarly, the Seventh Circuit held that the
plaintiff “was asserting a violation of her own rights—her fingerprints, her
private information—and [] this is enough to show injury-in-fact without further
tangible consequences.” 263 Reading the plain text of the legislative intent of the
Act, which states that “[t]he public welfare, security, and safety will be served
by regulating . . . biometric identifiers and information” and that “[b]iometrics
are unlike other unique identifiers . . . [because] once compromised, the
individual has no recourse.” 264 Both the Ninth and Seventh Circuits read this to
determine that the Illinois legislature intended to establish privacy rights in
individuals’ biometric information. The Illinois Supreme Court stated in
Rosenbach that “our General Assembly has codified that individuals possess a
right to privacy in and control over their biometric identifiers and biometric
information.” 265 The Supreme Court should affirm this interpretation and find
that BIPA created a statutory right in biometric privacy.
This brings us to our second inquiry—whether the risk of harm in situations
such as these is sufficient in the Court’s eyes to satisfy the requirement of
concreteness, and thus to constitute standing. In Spokeo, the Court noted that it
is possible for the “risk of real harm” to constitute a concrete injury. 266 In these
types of cases, the Court noted, plaintiffs “need not allege any additional harm
beyond the one Congress has identified.” 267 Both the Ninth and Seventh Circuits
looked to the Rosenbach decision for insight into the risk of real harm when
procedural BIPA violations were at issue. The Rosenbach court stated that the
procedural requirements of BIPA “are particularly crucial in our digital world”
because when a private entity “fails to adhere to the statutory procedures . . . the
right of the individual to maintain his or her biometric privacy vanishes into thin
air.” 268 This seems sufficient enough to constitute the “risk of real harm” the
Court discussed in Spokeo, and thus the Court should hold there is sufficient risk
of harm to satisfy the concreteness requirement when BIPA’s provisions are
violated—without showing any additional harm.
The Court may also evaluate BIPA standing from the perspective of its
informational injury jurisprudence. In Federal Election Commission v. Akins,
the Court held that a group of voters had standing to sue under the Federal
261.
262.
263.
264.
265.
266.
267.
268.

Santana v. Take-Two Interactive Software, Inc., 717 F. App’x. 12, 15 (2nd Cir. 2017).
Patel, 932 F.3d at 1274.
Bryant, 958 F.3d at 624.
740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 14/5.
Rosenbach v. Six Flags Ent. Corp., 129 N.E.3d 1197, 1206 (Ill. 2019).
Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S.Ct. 1540, 1549 (2016).
Id.
Rosenbach, 129 N.E.3d at 1206.
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Election Campaign Act of 1971 (“FECA”). 269 The plaintiffs sought to challenge
the Federal Election Commission’s determination that an organization was not
a political committee under FECA, and thus not subject to FECA’s
requirements. 270 The Court held that the injuries suffered by plaintiffs—the
“inability to obtain information” that they would be able to were the organization
determined to be a political committee and thus subject to FECA’s disclosure
requirements—was sufficient to confer standing. 271 The Court noted that FECA
was enacted with the intention to “protect voters such as respondents from
suffering the kind of injury here at issue.” 272 Similarly, in Public Citizen vs. U.S.
Dept. of Justice, the plaintiffs sued under the Federal Advisory Committee Act
(“FACA”) after the American Bar Association (“ABA”) refused requests for
meeting minutes and committee reports related to its advisory role to the federal
judiciary. 273 The plaintiffs argued that FACA should apply to the ABA, which
would require it to make publicly available its documents such as the minutes
and reports sought. 274 When the defendants sought to have the case dismissed
for lack of standing, the Court declined to do so, stating that “the refusal to
permit appellants to scrutinize the ABA Committee’s activities to the extent
FACA allows constitutes a sufficiently distinct injury to provide standing to
sue.” 275
The common thread in these cases is that the statutory right afforded was a
right to information that the plaintiffs were being denied. BIPA’s disclosure
requirement was characterized by the Seventh Circuit as a duty “owed to the
public generally” when it held that the Bryant defendant’s violation of that
provision resulted in “no particularized harm” to the plaintiff. 276 This would
seem to represent a possible conflict with Public Citizen and Akins and an
opportunity for the Court to clarify that the BIPA disclosure provision creates a
statutory right to information that, if denied, constitutes an informational injury
sufficient to confer standing.
B.

Potential Impact of a Supreme Court Decision on Standing for Procedural
BIPA Violations
1.

On BIPA Litigation in Federal Courts

If the Supreme Court instead resolved the standing split by finding no
federal standing for procedural BIPA violations, the immediate impact would be
269.
270.
271.
272.
273.
274.
275.
276.

524 U.S. 11, 14 (1998).
Id. at 13–14.
Id. at 21.
Id. at 20.
491 U.S. 440, 447 (1989).
Id.
Id. at 449.
Bryant v. Compass Grp. USA, Inc., 958 F.3d 617, 626 (7th Cir. 2020).
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the inability of federal courts to hear these cases, outside of a data breach
involving biometric information or other fact pattern where concrete harm may
be more easily demonstrated. These types of claims would then be litigated
exclusively in the Illinois state courts, where the Rosenbach decision ensures
there is standing to sue for even bare procedural violations. 277 The Court could
also find there is federal standing only for certain types of BIPA claims but not
others. This would result in some BIPA claims moving forward in federal court
while others (even those alleged in the same complaint) are remanded to Illinois
state courts for resolution—as was the case in Bryant, where the Seventh Circuit
found federal standing for the plaintiff’s 15(b) claims, but not for her 15(a)
claims. 278
Given the absence of the standing issue in Illinois courts, potential plaintiffs
seem to prefer to litigate BIPA claims there: it is the defendants who often
remove these actions to the federal courts. 279 This could be because corporate
defendants perceive federal courts to be more predictable, more transparent, and
“less subject to local biases” than state courts, 280 which could lead to defendants
removing more cases involving BIPA issues of first impression to federal,
hoping for a decision that will benefit the defense bar. 281 It is more difficult to
have a class certified in federal court than in state court, 282 and federal courts are
more likely to grant motions to dismiss than state courts, 283 which could play

277. See discussion infra Section II.A.
278. See discussion infra Section II.D.4; see also Hazlitt v. Apple Inc., No. 3:20-CV0421-NJR,
2020 WL 6681374, at *4–7, *11 (S.D. Ill. Nov. 12, 2020) (remanding plaintiffs’ claims under BIPA
sections 15(a) and (c) to state court for lack of Article III standing, while finding Article III standing
for and denying the defendant’s motion to dismiss in regard to the claim under BIPA section 15(b)).
279. See, e.g., Bryant v. Compass Grp. USA, Inc., 436 F. Supp. 3d 1087, 1088 (N.D. Ill. 2020)
(stating that Plaintiff “filed this putative class action in the Chancery Division of Cook County
Circuit Court” followed by, several months later, “Defendant [filing] a notice of removal in [federal
district court] . . . “); Peatry v. Bimbo Bakeries USA, Inc., 393 F. Supp. 3d 766, 767 (N.D. Ill. 2019)
(stating that Plaintiff “filed this putative class action lawsuit in state court” and the defendant
subsequently “removed the case to federal court on the basis of diversity jurisdiction and the Class
Action Fairness Act…” (citations omitted)); see also Marsh, supra note 97.
280. Colin E. Wrabley & Joshua T. Newborn, Getting Your Company’s Case Removed to
Federal Court When Sued in Your ‘Home’ State, LAW.COM (Dec. 19, 2017, 12:38 PM),
https://www.law.com/thelegalintelligencer/sites/thelegalintelligencer/2017/12/19/getting-yourcompanys-case-removed-to-federal-court-when-sued-in-your-home-state/ [https://perma.cc/RH5L
-ZMGY].
281. Rosa M. Tumialán, A BIPA Defense Victory—If You Squint, THE FIREWALL (Oct. 4, 2019),
https://www.thefirewall-blog.com/2019/10/a-bipa-defense-victory-if-you-squint/ [https://perma.cc
/Z6T5-ZGGG].
282. David Poell et al., Beware BIPA Bifurcation: Plaintiffs’ New Gambit to Split BIPA Claims
Between State and Federal Court, JDSUPRA (Mar. 17, 2021), https://www.jdsupra.com/legal
news/beware-bipa-bifurcation-plaintiffs-new-6284956/ [https://perma.cc/BKF4-G8A7].
283. See Max Kennerly, Unanimous Supreme Court Resets “Principal Place of Business” For
Diversity Jurisdiction, LITIGATION & TRIAL (Feb. 24, 2010), https://www.litigationandtrial.com
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into defendants’ decisions as well. Whatever the reasons, a Supreme Court
decision finding no standing for procedural BIPA violations would deprive
corporate class-action defendants of a federal forum, seemingly counter to the
purposes of CAFA, which was passed to provide a federal forum for such
defendants. 284
However, the current open question of federal standing for procedural
violations ultimately allows both plaintiffs and defendants to delay the
resolution of suits, and drive up litigation costs, and increase the burden on
courts through strategic tactics deployed to obtain a party’s desired forum. 285
Plaintiffs’ attorneys may prefer the bifurcation of BIPA claims— where some
are remanded to state court while others are litigated in federal court—because
they can both obtain their preferred state court forum and simultaneously be
litigating in two venues at once, which may be to their advantage. 286 It also
increases defense costs and likely pressures defendants to settle. The current
state of BIPA federal standing also encourages the type of strategy such as that
found in Thornley, where the plaintiff’s proposed class was limited to those
suffering no injury “other than statutory aggrievement” 287 in order to avoid
federal court, which may discourage defendants from remanding at all—or, it
may encourage them to remand again, later, if the plaintiffs go on to “change
their tune in state court,” which the Thornley court hinted could allow defendants
a chance at future removal back to a federal forum. 288 It may also discourage
defendants from addressing standing as a threshold issue at all, instead saving it
for class certification. 289
On the other hand, clarifying that there is federal standing for procedural
BIPA violations serves the interests of both plaintiffs and defendants: it would
/2010/02/articles/the-law/for-lawyers/unanimous-supreme-court-resets-principle-place-of-busi
ness-for-diversity-jurisdiction/ [https://perma.cc/9VPM-BHVF].
284. William Branigan, Congress Changes Class Action Rules, WASH. POST (Feb. 17, 2005,
3:55 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A32674-2005Feb17.html [https://per
ma.cc/HN9U-LZ8J] (“[CAFA] had been strongly pushed by business groups, which argued that
class-action lawsuits were enriching trial lawyers, who often filed them in certain jurisdictions
known for sympathetic judges and juries.”).
285. The plaintiffs in In re Facebook Biometric Information Privacy Litigation highlighted the
bizarre position of the defendant, who was the party responsible for removing the case from state
to federal court, stating that “[a]s the party asserting federal jurisdiction, Facebook maintains the
burden to demonstrate that [the plaintiffs] have Article III standing, which it has now disavowed.”
Plaintiffs’ Joint Response in Opposition to Facebook’s Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Subject
Matter Jurisdiction at 13, In re Facebook Biometric Privacy Litigation, No. 3:16-cv-00937-JD
(N.D. Cal. Aug. 4, 2016), 2016 WL 4533593.
286. Poell et al., supra note 282.
287. Thornley v. Clearview AI, Inc., 984 F.3d 1241, 1246 (7th Cir. 2021).
288. Id. at 1248.
289. Lincoln Wilson & Michael Fazio, Defense Strategies When Plaintiffs Deny Their Own
Standing, LAW360 (Feb. 17, 2021, 5:05 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/1354306/defensestrategies-when-plaintiffs-deny-their-own-standing [https://perma.cc/YTD2-JAYG].
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allow both plaintiffs and defendants access to the federal court system, and allow
federal courts to actually get to the merits of the suits. This could create benefits
for both plaintiffs and defendants by litigating in a venue that may have more
expertise and/or experience than state courts with cases involving data privacy,
such as the Ninth Circuit, home to the headquarters of many technology
corporations, while allowing defendants to access the federal courts and the
benefits of diversity jurisdiction. It would encourage compliance with BIPA,
providing entities using biometric data with “the strongest possible incentive to
conform to the law and prevent problems before the occur and cannot be
undone.” 290 Most importantly, though, finding standing for procedural BIPA
violations would affirm that violations of privacy rights granted by BIPA are, in
fact, harms sufficiently injurious—concrete, particularized, and actual—to grant
Article III standing. As the Illinois Supreme Court noted in Rosenbach, BIPA
“vests in individuals and customers the right to control their biometric
information” and a failure to adhere to the statute’s provisions results in this
right being taken from the individual—such a violation “is no mere
‘technicality.’” 291
2.

On Information Privacy Suits More Generally

Beyond BIPA litigation in federal courts, a ruling settling the circuit split on
standing under the Act would have implications for suits brought under other
privacy laws that grant consumers a statutory right to sue violators. 292 This
involves a broader circuit split regarding standing to sue for procedural statutory
violations where the alleged injury is a future risk of harm. 293
The Sixth and Ninth Circuits have held that the risk of future misuse of
personal data can constitute a concrete harm sufficient to create standing. The
Ninth Circuit articulated this in the Patel decision. The Sixth Circuit reached a
similar conclusion in Galaria v. Nationwide Mutual Insurance Company, a suit
brought under the FCRA. 294 There, the court found standing because of an
290. Rosenbach v. Six Flags Ent. Corp., 129 N.E.3d 1197, 1207 (Ill. 2019).
291. Id. at 1206.
292. Commentators have noted that since Spokeo, the Court has “remain[ed] reluctant to
address privacy harms under Article III standing,” denying certiorari to a number of cases involving
Article III standing. Boyd Garriott & Megan Brown, Zappos and the Supreme Court’s Reluctance
to Address Privacy Harms Under Article III Standing, WILEY CONNECT (Mar. 27, 2019),
https://www.wileyconnect.com/home/2019/3/27/zappos-and-the-supreme-courts-reluctance-toaddress-privacy-harms-under-article-iii-standing [https://perma.cc/M27D-9YNR]. In fact, Circuit
Judge Hamilton of the Seventh Circuit, in a concurring opinion to Thornley, implored the Supreme
Court to “revisit the problem of standing in private actions based on intangible injuries under a host
of federal consumer protection statutes.” Thornley v. Clearview AI, Inc., 984 F.3d 1241, 1251 (7th
Cir. 2021) (Hamilton, J., concurring).
293. Facebook, the Patel defendant, discussed this split in its appeal to the Supreme Court,
which was ultimately denied. See Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, supra note 189, at 21.
294. 663 F. App’x. 384, 385–86 (6th Cir. 2016).
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“increased risk of fraud and identify theft” that resulted because the plaintiffs’
data was part of a breach at the defendant insurance company. 295 The court did
not require the plaintiffs to show their data was either actually misused or at an
imminent risk of being misused as a result of the breach. 296
Other circuits have ruled differently, holding that mere potential misuse of
personal information is not sufficient to establish standing. In Katz v. Pershing,
LLC, a Massachusetts consumer brought suit against a financial technology
company, alleging their digital financial platform (of which the plaintiff was a
user) failed to adequately protect user information in violation of the
Massachusetts Unfair and Deceptive Trade Practices Act and the state’s general
consumer protection statutes. 297 Because “the plaintiff [did] not allege that her
nonpublic personal information actually has been accessed by any unauthorized
person,” the First Circuit reasoned that the plaintiff’s “cause of action rests
entirely on the hypothesis that at some point an unauthorized, as-yet
unidentified, third party might access her data and then attempt to purloin her
identity.” 298 Because the risk of harm the plaintiff alleged was “unanchored to
any actual incident of data breach,” the court held the plaintiff failed to “satisfy
Article III’s requirement of actual or impending injury.” 299
The Third Circuit reached a similar conclusion in Reilly v. Ceridian Corp. 300
There, the plaintiffs sued the defendant payroll processing company after the
company suffered a breach in which a hacker infiltrated its systems and
potentially gained access to personal and financial information belonging to
about 27,000 people, though it was unknown whether the hacker read or copied
that information. 301 The court held that the plaintiffs’ “allegations of
hypothetical, future injury are insufficient to establish standing” because the
allegations relied on “speculation” that the hacker copied and intended to misuse
their personal information. 302 Noting that “unless and until these conjectures
come true, [plaintiffs] have not suffered any injury,” the court dismissed the
suit. 303
Finally, like the First and Third Circuits, the Fourth Circuit also declined to
find standing based upon future risk of data use in Beck v. McDonald, which
involved a breach of medical information. 304 There, similar to Reilly, the court

295.
296.
297.
298.
299.
300.
301.
302.
303.
304.

Id. at 388.
Id.
672 F.3d 64, 69–70 (1st Cir. 2012).
Id. at 79.
Id. at 80.
664 F.3d 38, 42 (3d Cir. 2011).
Id. at 40.
Id. at 42.
Id. at 42, 46.
848 F.3d 262, 267 (4th Cir. 2017).
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held that the plaintiffs’ allegation of an “enhanced risk” of identity theft was too
speculative to establish standing. 305
The resolution by the Supreme Court in the BIPA matter would also resolve
this broader split, assuming the facts allege only a risk of misuse of the plaintiffs’
biometric information that the procedural BIPA violation causes. Given the
prevalence of data breaches and consumer discomfort with the use of personal
information by private companies, a resolution finding standing for procedural
violations is the right finding for this broader split as well because it provides
consumers the ability to enforce their rights under the limited existing privacy
statutes that allow them to do so, while incentivizing companies to highly
prioritize compliance with existing regulations.
C. The Need for a More Permissive Understanding of Standing in the
Context of Privacy
The correct reading of BIPA is that its provisions were established to protect
individuals’ concrete interests in the privacy of their biometric data: the law’s
provisions are not mere procedural rights, and even procedural or technical
violations of the Act cause actual harm by depriving individuals of the privacy
and control that BIPA was enacted to provide. It seems that the Illinois
Legislature’s intent in passing BIPA was not only to regulate the use of
consumer biometric information, but to ensure they had a means to enforce such
regulation before a data breach. This can be found in the legislative findings and
intent section of the Act, which states that “biometrics are unlike other unique
identifiers” because they are “unique to the individual; therefore, once
compromised, the individual has no recourse, is at heightened risk for identity
theft, and is likely to withdraw from biometric-facilitated transactions.” 306 The
Act compares biometrics, which are unchangeable, to other sensitive types of
information such as Social Security numbers, which it notes “can be changed”
when compromised. 307 This supports the finding that the intent of BIPA was not
to merely regulate the use of biometric information, as the Second Circuit
assumed, but to establish a right of privacy, at least from non-public entities, in
one’s biometric information.
This belief is further supported by other provisions of the Act’s findings and
intent section. BIPA notes that “an overwhelming majority of members of the
public are weary of the use of biometrics when such information is tied to
finances and other personal information.” 308 The Act also states that “[t]he full
ramifications of biometric technology are not fully known.” 309 In addition to the
305.
306.
307.
308.
309.

Id. at 274.
740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 14/5(c) (2018).
Id.
Id. § 14/5(d).
Id. § 14/5(f).
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provision, the final provision in the findings and intent section of BIPA states
that “[t]he public welfare, security, and safety will be served by regulating the
collection, use, safeguarding, handling, storage, retention, and destruction of
biometric [data].” 310 Taking all of these provisions together, it would appear that
the intent of the legislature was not merely to regulate the use of biometric data
but to establish a right of privacy in it—i.e., to allow consumers to clearly choose
which private entity they wished to allow to collect their biometric data and for
what purpose.
The Act’s substantive provisions clearly support this belief. They include
strict provisions for consent: BIPA does not just require consent but requires a
“written release executed by the subject of the biometric [data]” after the subject
has been informed “in writing of the specific purpose and length of term for
which . . . [the biometric data] is being collected, stored, and used” before the
biometric data can be used. 311 It appears that the intent was to require companies
to first provide written explanations of why they are collecting biometric data
before receiving clear, written consent from consumers in order to proceed with
the collection. This would support the belief that the intent behind BIPA was to
establish a right of privacy in biometrics because consumers can clearly, under
the Act, withhold their consent to the use of their biometrics if they find issue
with the reasons why a company is using biometric information or to that
company’s length of retention of the biometrics.
With this more expansive reading of legislative intent, a procedural violation
of BIPA constitutes a violation of the concrete privacy right that is behind the
Act, not merely a procedural right, thus conferring standing under Article III.
This is essentially what the Ninth Circuit held in Patel, stating that “[w]hen a
private entity fails to adhere to the statutory procedures . . . the right of the
individual to maintain his or her biometric privacy vanishes into thin air.” 312
This is the correct interpretation and finding.
Furthermore, there is the practical matter of enforcement: the Act intended,
unlike other state biometric privacy laws, to allow consumers the right to enforce
their own right to privacy. That is made clear in the Act’s provisions allowing
“[a]ny person aggrieved by a violation” of BIPA to sue for liquidated damages
of up to $5,000 per violation. 313 Especially in class action suits that can add up
to actual and meaningful penalties (or, at least, large settlements) for companies
that use biometrics, BIPA’s monetary penalties may spur such companies to be

310. Id. § 14/5(g).
311. 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 14/15(b)(2)-(3) (2018).
312. Patel v. Facebook, Inc., 932 F.3d 1264, 1274 (9th Cir. 2019) (citing Rosenbach v. Six
Flags Ent. Corp., 129 N.E.3d 1197, 1206 (Ill. 2019)).
313. 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 14/20(1) (2018).
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more careful in their biometric collection and use. 314 Furthermore, unlike other
privacy statutes, the ability for consumers to bring suit means BIPA does not
rely exclusively on state attorneys, who may be underfunded and overworked,
for enforcement.
While there may be valid critiques for the ever-growing number of lawsuits
filed in our litigious society, private litigation is recognized as a critical means
of law enforcement in the American legal system, acting as an important
supplement to public enforcement. 315 Scholars have noted that private actions
allow individuals to “deal with problems that have not been adequately
addressed by other institutions” and “[free] individuals from total dependence
on collective bureaucratic remedies . . .” 316 Given the lack of robust data privacy
regulations, combined with society’s apparent desire for such regulations, this
description sums up the role BIPA has played quite perfectly—it serves as a
means for individuals to deal with problems surrounding data protection that the
government has barely touched.
Further, given that private companies’ use of biometrics are essentially
unregulated outside of BIPA (and a few other state statutes), 317 and that the
general public has a clear apprehension around both the use of biometric
information and personal data generally, 318 tools like BIPA are needed to
regulate the use of biometrics and personal information. The CCPA’s inception
in 2020, its expansion under the CPRA beginning in 2023, as well as the pending
data privacy initiatives percolating in state legislatures across the country, 319
highlight society’s desire for more regulation of the use of personal data. A
finding by the Court that standing cannot exist for procedural violations would
314. Highlighting the fact that BIPA settlements can be of high enough financial importance to
a company, Facebook’s $550 million settlement of the Patel case was announced on its quarterly
earnings call with investors in January 2020. Singer & Isaac, supra note 191.
315. J. Maria Glover, The Structural Role of Private Enforcement Mechanisms in Public Law,
53 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1137, 1143 (2012) (discussing “the American regulatory system’s
functional dependence on private regulation and the mechanisms that enable it”).
316. Richard B. Stewart, Crisis in Tort Law? The Institutional Perspective, 54 UNIV. CHI. L.
REV. 184, 198 (1987).
317. April Glaser, Biometrics Are Coming, Along With Serious Security Concerns, WIRED
(Mar. 9, 2016, 11:00 AM), https://www.wired.com/2016/03/biometrics-coming-along-serioussecurity-concerns/ [https://perma.cc/YW9A-AV5T] (noting that “the use of data about
[individuals’] body parts is largely unregulated”).
318. A 2016 Deloitte study found that eighty-one percent of consumers feel they “have lost
control over how their personal data are collected and used” by companies. Vikram Rao & Kruttika
Dwivedi, To Share or Not to Share: What Consumers Really Think About Sharing Their Personal
Information, DELOITTE INSIGHTS (Sept. 5, 2017), https://www2.deloitte.com/us/en/insights/indus
try/retail-distribution/sharing-personal-information-consumer-privacy-concerns.html [https://per
ma.cc/ZG4H-BHZN].
319. See Andrew Burt, States are Leading the Way on Data Privacy, THE HILL (Aug. 21, 2018,
10:30 AM), https://thehill.com/opinion/technology/402775-states-are-leading-the-way-on-dataprivacy [https://perma.cc/66YH-UG3L].
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ignore the headlines that consumers have seen for the past decade about the use
of personal data and add to the public’s apprehension surrounding private
companies’ use of their data. The multitude of data breaches 320 have left the
impression that companies, left to their own devices, are unable to protect
personal information effectively, and the disclosures of unauthorized, or at least
less-than-forthcoming, collection and use of personal data by profit-making
companies 321 leaves the impression they do not even care to try. A finding of
Article III standing by the Supreme Court would update its standing
jurisprudence to factor in our society’s current understanding of the importance
of data and privacy, and would not be out of left field, but instead build upon the
Court’s recent precedents—it has, after all, recently found that law
enforcement’s unrestricted use of new technologies can violate an individual’s
expectation of privacy. 322
In the 21st century, where the use of personal information is worth billions
of dollars or more 323 and consumers are left feeling helpless, procedural
320. See, e.g., Tara Siegel Bernard et al., Equifax Says Cyberattack May Have Affected 143
Million in the U.S., N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 7, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/07/business
/equifax-cyberattack.html [https://perma.cc/3XTJ-42RQ]; Paul Ziobro & Danny Yadron, Target
Now Says 70 Million People Hit in Data Breach, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 10, 2014), https://www.wsj.com
/articles/no-headline-available-1389359240 [https://perma.cc/77J3-RNHN]; Kristina Libby, 100
Million Capital One Accounts Were Hacked in a Mass Data Breach, YAHOO! (July 30, 2019),
https://www.yahoo.com/lifestyle/100-million-capital-one-accounts-200200291.html [https://per
ma.cc/FC9J-A4CT]; Liana B. Baker & Jim Finkle, Sony PlayStation Suffers Massive Data Breach,
REUTERS (Apr. 26, 2011, 6:56 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-sony-stoldendata/sonyplaystation-suffers-massive-data-breach-idUSTRE73P6WB20110427 [https://perma.cc/5DYJ-AY
5Z].
321. See, e.g., Carole Cadwalladr & Emma Graham-Harrison, Revealed: 50 Million Facebook
Profiles Harvested for Cambridge Analytica in Major Data Breach, THE GUARDIAN (Mar. 17,
2018, 6:03 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/news/2018/mar/17/cambridge-analytica-facebookinfluence-us-election [https://perma.cc/9XDN-AGP3]; Jonathan Stempel, Google faces $5 billion
lawsuit in U.S. for tracking ‘private’ internet use, REUTERS (June 2, 2020, 5:11 PM),
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-alphabet-google-privacy-lawsuit-idUSKBN23933H
[https://perma.cc/E93M-BXMW]; Kaya Yurieff, Apple apologizes for listening to Siri recordings,
promises changes, CNN (Aug. 28, 2019, 3:11 PM), https://www.cnn.com/2019/08/28/tech/applesiri-apology/index.html [https://perma.cc/LXQ4-6EST].
322. See Carpenter v. U.S., 138 S.Ct. 2206, 2209 (2018) (requiring the government to obtain a
warrant supported before acquiring an individual’s cell-site location information from wireless
carriers).
323. There are a variety of estimates of the economic value of personal data to the global
economy, many of which reach into the trillions of dollars. See Vasudha Thirani & Arvind Gupta,
The Value of Data, WORLD ECONOMIC FORUM (Sept. 22, 2017), https://www.weforum.org/agenda
/2017/09/the-value-of-data/ [https://perma.cc/EF3S-BBEK] (stating the value of the global data
economy as three trillion dollars); HM TREASURY, THE ECONOMIC VALUE OF DATA: DISCUSSION
PAPER 5 (2018), https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads
/attachment_data/file/731349/20180730_HMT_Discussion_Paper_-_The_Economic_Value
_of_Data.pdf [https://perma.cc/GLP6-GD7K] (stating that “cross-border flows of data” were worth
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violations of privacy regulations should be sufficient to constitute a concrete
injury. It seems only fair that given the ability of companies to exploit consumer
data for profit, that consumers should have the ability to enforce violations, even
mere procedural ones, of their statutory rights in their data. The alternative
leaves consumers the ability to enforce their privacy rights only after they have
been violated and their information has leaked. The ineffectiveness of this
situation is highlighted in the legislative intent provision of BIPA, which notes
the inability of consumers to change their biometric information 324—clearly,
there should be a means to enforce violations of BIPA’s protections before such
violations result in a breach of immutable data. Given the significant settlements
that BIPA has resulted in, and the fact that individual instances of biometric
information collection may constitute individual violations, each worth $1,000
or $5,000 in liquidated damages, there are financial disincentives for companies
to violate the Act’s provisions. 325 Again, all of this is dependent on the ability to
sue when these provisions are violated.
Standing for procedural violations additionally provides clarity for
companies who use biometric information. Instead of performing a complicated
analysis on whether a risk of injury can satisfy the concreteness requirement,
standing would unify the federal courts with Illinois state courts and make clear
that procedural violations provide a method for consumers to bring private
actions, highlighting the importance of compliance.

$2.8 trillion, or 3.3% of global GDP, in 2014). The estimates of the data individual companies
possess is also quite high; in the 2015 bankruptcy of Caesars Entertainment, its most valuable asset
was determined to be the data it held on its customers who had joined its loyalty program, worth
one billion dollars. Fuel of the Future; The Data Economy, THE ECONOMIST (May 6, 2017)
(ProQuest, Doc. ID 1895923853). However, it is difficult to calculate the value of an individual
firm’s data in the absence of any accounting standards for valuation. See generally John Akred &
Anjali Samani, Your Data Is Worth More Than You Think, MIT SLOAN MGMT. REV. (Jan. 18,
2018), https://sloanreview.mit.edu/article/your-data-is-worth-more-than-you-think/ [https://perma
.cc/CW75-ERJA].
324. 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 14/5(c) (2018).
325. The rising cost of BIPA noncompliance is even highlighted in marketing materials of
companies selling compliance solutions and biometric technology. See, e.g., The Cost of BIPA Non
Compliance is High, GTB TECHNOLOGIES, https://gttb.com/cost-bipa-non-compliance-high/
[https://perma.cc/Y57Q-6K8M] (stating that “the cost of BIPA non-compliance is high” but that
the company’s Smart DLP product is “specifically designed to be able to demonstrate compliance
of regulatory statutes”); Biometrics: The Only Irrefutable Proof of Identity, HID GLOBAL,
https://www.hidglobal.com/solutions/biometric-regulations
[https://perma.cc/5NCV-S36L]
(stating that biometrics, which the company’s technology products are designed to utilize, are “the
simplest, most convenient and most secure way of proving identity” and that “addressing BIPA
compliance requirements is well within the reach of most companies”).
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IV. CONCLUSION
While a federal data-privacy regulatory framework may be desirable, 326 a
federal data law has not arrived and does not look likely given the current
paralysis in Washington, D.C. 327 Thus, state privacy laws like BIPA stand on
their own and should not be hamstrung by an outdated definition of standing that
fails to account for the importance of personal information in today’s society. 328
In fact, BIPA may be one of the most important data privacy regulations in the
U.S. and is likely the most important biometric information law on the books,
given its unique provision for private consumers to bring suit, its wide reach to
defendants far outside of Illinois, and its potential for high financial penalties if
individual instances of improper biometric collection or use constitute a separate
violation. Commentators have noted that “only private causes of action seem
capable of meaningfully deterring companies from engaging in practices with
biometrics based on business models that inevitably lead to unacceptable
abuses.” 329 BIPA squarely gives consumers the right to enforce statutory
violations involving their own biometric data, instead of leaving it up to state
attorneys general, whose offices are subject to budgetary constraints and
political pressure. 330

326. Surprisingly, given the lack of movement on federal privacy regulation, essentially all
stakeholders support the concept of federal privacy legislation. The national trade association for
digital media and marketing businesses “strongly supports” a federal law. IAB Urges Congress to
Pass Federal Privacy Legislation to Protect Consumers & Avoid Patchwork of State Laws, IAB
(Feb. 26, 2019), https://www.iab.com/news/iab-urges-congress-to-pass-federal-privacy-legislation
-to-protect-consumers-avoid-patchwork-of-state-laws/ [https://perma.cc/FRX5-NYUH]. Further,
there is bipartisan support for a federal privacy law. Kate Kaye, Cheat Sheet: What to Expect in
State and Federal Privacy Regulation in 2021, DIGIDAY (Feb. 1, 2021), https://digiday.com/media
/cheatsheet-what-to-expect-in-state-and-federal-privacy-regulation-in-2021/ [https://perma.cc/2R
EX-C9YQ]. Oddly, the widespread support for such a law may work against its passage, because
the devil, as always, is in the details: commentors note that while businesses want a uniform,
national law with which to comply, they likely want this law to be weaker than the state laws
currently on the books. Id. Further, Democrats and Republicans differ on several critical aspects of
federal privacy regulation, including whether a federal law should override state and local laws,
and whether the right to sue violators should be restricted to state attorneys general or extended to
individuals. Id.
327. See, e.g., John Hendel, ‘Embarrassing’: Congress Stumbles in Push for Consumer Privacy
Bill, POLITICO (July 12, 2019, 5:51 PM), https://www.politico.com/story/2019/07/12/congressconsumer-privacy-bill-1582540 [https://perma.cc/57DZ-FWBB].
328. If anything, more and more patchwork state laws may pressure the federal government
into enacting federal privacy legislation. See Mark Smith, Analysis: California Gamble Raises
Odds on Federal Privacy Law, BLOOMBERG LAW (July 2, 2020, 11:52 AM), https://www.bloom
berglaw.com/product/privacy/document/XE6145DC000000 [https://perma.cc/A8HF-MF3C].
329. Hartzog, supra note 67, at 101.
330. See Danielle Keats Citron, The Privacy Policymaking of State Attorneys General, 92
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 747, 797, 804 (2016).
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The Seventh and Ninth Circuits were correct in finding that BIPA confers
privacy rights in individuals’ biometric information, and that the violation of
these rights—the failure to adhere to BIPA’s requirements—is sufficient to
confer Article III standing. Given the clear intent behind the Illinois
Legislature’s passage of BIPA and the importance of protecting biometric
information prior to its unauthorized disclosure, it is time for a new
understanding of standing in privacy contexts that allows consumers to bring
suit for privacy violations when statutes like BIPA give them the right to do so.
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